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PROCEDURAL NOTE
This is a Petition for Rehearing is filed by appellant Maverik
pursuant to Rule 3 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

It

is a consolidated Petition for Rehearing on two appeal numbers:
Docket Number 920206-CA and Docket Number 910413-CA.

Those two

appeals are from the same Industrial Commission administrative
case, and were combined for oral argument.

The decision of this

Court was rendered as a consolidated decision, a copy of which is
attached hereto as Appendix A.

The decision was rendered on June

3, 1993.

INTRODUCTION TO PETITION FOR REHEARING
This is a case in which the Court held, in essence, that
Maverik has no remedy because, although it filed two appeals, one
was too early and the other was too late. In so finding, the Court
misapprehended the law, setting a problematic precedent that should
not become law.

Because the misperceived law was not adequately

briefed, the Court was unaware that its ruling was contrary to the
opinion of the Utah Supreme Court.
The underlying case is a claim that when Maverik fired
claimant/respondent

McCord,

it

1

was

guilty

of

handicap

discrimination.

The Court did not reach any of the appeal issues,

since both appeals were dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.

FACTS PERTINENT TO REHEARING
Most of the relevant facts are set forth in pages one through
four of the Court's Opinion.

Appendix 1.

One of the "facts" as

stated in the Opinion needs clarification, however.
observed that McCord was hired

The court

(two weeks after termination by

Maverik and at a higher wage) as a school custodian.

Opinion p. 2.

However, the Court stated that she "quit due to an unrelated
illness."

Id.

That the illness was "unrelated"
record.

is not supported by the

As the Court observes, it should base its decision on

facts found by the Commission.
209 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, 34

See, King v. Industrial
(Utah App. 1993).

Commission,
The

Commission

actually found that she quit, and that it was due to illness beyond
her control, Findings, p. 5, 8.

But the Commission did not find

that it was from a problem unrelated to the condition she claims
Maverik

fired her for.

McCord of feared no evidence as to the

physical condition that made her quit..
The facts most relevant to this Petition are:
1.

On June 26, 1991 the ALJ issued its order resolving all

matters on their merits, but reserving the amount of attorney fees
2

to be awarded.
2.

Opinion, p. 3.

On July 26, 1991 Maverik filed its Writ of Review with

this Court ("first appeal").
3.

Id.

See Docket No. 910413-CA.

On September 10, 1991, despite the pending appeal, the

Commission issued its Supplemental Order limited to the issue of
attorney fees.
4.

Id.

Despite

its pending

appeal, Maverik, McCord

Commission continued to litigate at the agency level.
5.

and the

Id.

Maverik filed a Request for Review within the Industrial

Commission, which was not received until October 11, 1991 (deemed
to be one day late).

Id.

6. Maverik's "second appeal" (920206-CA) was a Writ of Review
with this Court, claiming that the Commission erred or abused its
discretion in finding Maverik's Request for Review untimely.

Id.;

see also, briefs of Maverik in second appeal.
7.

Oral argument was held on May 20, 1993.

At argument it

became clear that the Court's panel was focusing closely on the
jurisdictional issues rather than the merits. Under questioning by
Presiding Judge Billings, Maverik's counsel in essence conceded
that the first Commission order of June 26th was not final, since
the attorney fee issue was reserved.1

1

This, however, is not an

A few days after oral argument, a prominent local attorney
who was in the audience at oral argument directed Maverik's counsel
3

accurate statement of the law.

See argument below.

8. The Court's Opinion was issued June 3, 199 3. Appendix 1.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
For years the federal courts have held that where a tribunal
reserves only the issue of attorney fees, the resulting order is
final and appealable. Utah (like many other states) seems to have
adopted the federal rule in 1989.

This Court's decision that

Maverik's first appeal was nonfinal because the attorney fee issues
was reserved is contrary to this authority, and therefore in error.
This Court was also mistaken in holding that the first appeal,
filed within thirty days of the Industrial Commission's initial
order but a few weeks before its Supplemental Order, was premature.
The Court may not have considered Rule 4(c) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, which makes such a premature appeal effective
as if filed on the date the final order was entered.

ARGUMENT
1. The first order was final. The law on this point was not

to the decision of Allen Steel Co. v. Crossroads Plaza
Associates,
119 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (Utah 1989, later settled and withdrawn during
rehearing process). See discussion in Argument section below.
4

fully discussed in the briefing.2

At oral argument, the panel of

this Court and the respective counsel proceeded on the incorrect
assumption that the agency's reservation of the attorney fee issue
made the Findings
nonfinal.3

of Fact,

Conclusions

of Law and Order

of the ALJ

The Court's opinion uses this misunderstanding of the

law to hold that the Court had no jurisdiction; that the first
appeal was from a nonfinal order.4

See,

e.g. pp. 2, 5.

The Findings, Conclusions and Order disposed of all issues and
constituted a final (albeit incorrect) determination on the merits.
The

issue of

attorney

separable matter.

fee entitlement

or amount

is ai wholly

The agency's reservation of that issue does not

make the order nonfinal or prevent it from being appealed.

2.

Utah has chosen to allow an appeal on which the attorney

2

As the Court alluded to in footnote 4
Court is at a disadvantage when an issue is
Such was the case here, where the line of
pertinent to this Petition for Rehearing were
to the Court.

of the Opinion, the
not fully briefed.
cases and the rule
not fully presented

3

Of course jurisdiction either exists or it does not, and
cannot be created or destroyed by acquiescence of the parties.
See, Arnica Mut. Ins.
v. Schettler,
738 P.2d 641 (Utah 1987).
4

The opinion which is about to be published contains
incorrect law.
Fortunately, the rehearing process permitted by
Rule 35, Utah R. App. P., allow this problem to be remedied before
this case is used as precedent, and short of petitioning for

certiorari.
5

fee issue remains pending.

The holding that the first appeal is

not final is erroneous. The question facing this Court was whether
reservation of the attorney fee issue in an otherwise final order
makes

the

order

nonappealable.

This

issue

is

one

impression in Utah, except for the case of Allen
Crossroads

Plaza

Associates/

of

Steel

first
Co.

v.

119 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (Utah S. Ct.

1989, rehearing before Supreme Court requested and briefed and case
settled without publication in Pacific Reporter).

The Allen

Steel

decision is attached hereto as Appendix 2.
Not one of our previous cases has expressly ruled on the
specific issue of whether the* deferral of awarding
attorney fees makes a judgment nonfinal and therefore
noncertifiable under Rule 54(b).
See, e.g., Elder
v.
Triax Co., 740 P. 2d 1320 (Utah 1987) [see Justice Howe's
dissent at 1324]; Arnica Mutual
Ins.
v. Schettler,
738
P.2d 641 (Utah 1987); Olsen
v. Salt
Lake City
School
Dist.,
724 P.2d 960 (Utah 1986) . . . .
Allen

Steel,

199 Utah Adv. Rep. at 9.

The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Allen

Steel

least a statement of what Utah's law is or should be.5

is at very
That case

involved the issue of finality, though it related to Rule 54(b),

5

The Allen
Steel
decision was pulled and never published.
A petition for rehearing was pending in the Utah Supreme Court when
the appeal was dismissed by stipulation on April 1, 1991.
Allen
Steel
was cited once, in Gold Standard,
Inc.
v. American
Barrick
Resources
Corp.,
805 P.2d 164 (Utah 1990).
6

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.6
entire court7 in Allen
here as well.8

Steel

But the rule of law stated by the

is stated in broad terms and applies

Since finality under these circumstances

question of first impression, Allen
guidance.

used federal law for

In determining procedural matters, the Court may freely

refer to authorities which have
federal courts.
Corp.,

Steel

is a

Gold Standard,

interpreted

Inc.

v.

Allen

805 P.2d 164 (Utah 1990).

American
Steel

similar
Barrick

issues in
Resources

reasoned:

At federal law, a pending claim for attorney fees does
not make a judgment on the merits nonappealable.
See
Beaudry Motor Co. v. Abko Properties, Inc., 780 F.2d 751,
755 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 825 (1986) . . .
; Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Daniels, 763 F.2d 286, 292,
aff'd on rehearing, 768 F.2d 140 (7th Cir. 1985) (M[A]
judgment on the merits is appealable — independently of

6

Rule 54 states in part, "When more than one claim for relief
is presented in an action, . . . . and/or when multiple parties are
involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon
an express determination by the court that there is no just reason
for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment.
. . . Rule 54(b), Utah R. Civ. Proc.
7

Justices Hall, Howe and Durham joined in the opinion written
by justice Stewart. Justice Zimmerman concurred in the pertinent
portion of the opinion.
8

Rule 54 has no applicability to reservation of the attorney
fee issue. Beaudry Motor Co. v. ABKO Properties,
Inc.,
780 F.2d
751, 755 (9th Cir. 1986), citing to International
Assoc,
of
Bridge
v. Madison Industries,
Inc.,
733 F.2d 656, 658 (9th Cir. 1984) (a
judgment on the merits is final and appealable even though a
request for attorney fees is pending); Swanson v. American
Consumer
Industries,
Inc.,
517 F.2d 555, 571 (7th Cir. 1975) (Rule 54(b)
inapplicable to outstanding claim for attorney fees).
7

Rule 54(b) — despite the fact that questions of fees
remain."). Thus, an actual award of attorney fees need
not be reduced to judgment to make the judgement final
for appeal purposes since the fees awarded will often
include the fees incurred on appeal.
Allen

Steel,

3.

199 Utah Adv. Rep. at 9, emphasis supplied.

Federal law would clearly allow jurisdiction.

surprising that the Allen

Steel

It is not

case looked to federal law in the

absence of any Utah state law.
In addition to the above mentioned cases from various federal
courts of appeals, this issue has been determined by the United
States Supreme Court, in Budinich

v.

Bectom

Dickinson

U.S. 196, 100 L.Ed.2d 178, 108 S.Ct. 1717 (1988).
Budinich

and Co.,

486

A copy of the

decision, which affirms the holding of the Tenth Circuit

Court of Appeals, is attached as Appendix 3.
Budinich
problem here.

was interestingly

similar to the jurisdictional

There the trial court entered an order determining

the merits of the case, and (as with the agency order here) said a
reasonable attorney

fee should be awarded.

The trial court

requested that the parties brief and document the attorney fees
before the amount was determined.

The Tenth Circuit correctly

found that the first order was final and appealable despite the
reservation of the attorney fee issue, and that an appeal was
waived if not filed within thirty days of that order.
8

After

a

careful

review

of

the

various

authorities

and

equities, the need for operational consistency and predictability
"requires, we think, a uniform rule that an unresolved issue of
attorney's fees for the litigation in question does not prevent
judgment on the merits from being final."

Id., 108 S.Ct. at 1722,

emphasis supplied.
Courts and litigants are best served by the bright-line
rule, which accords with traditional understanding, that
a decision on the merits is a 'final decision' for
purposes of [28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 providing for appeal of
district court 'final decisions'] whether or not there
remains for adjudication a request for attorney's fees
attributable to the case.
Budinich,

108 S.Ct. at 1722, emphasis supplied.

4.

Other states hold such an order final and appealable.

See, e.g., Schleft

v.

Board

of

Education

of

Los

Alamos,

752 P.2d

248, 249 (CA New Mexico 1988) ("the pendency of a proceeding solely
to determine the amount of costs does not render an otherwise final
judgment nonfinal", using federal cases for guidance); Azer
Myers,

v.

8 Haw. App. 86, 793 P.2d 1189, 1216-17, cert, granted, 833

P. 2d 901, cert, denied, 833 P. 2d 901, affirmed in part, reversed in
part (not on finality issue), 795 P.2d 853 (Haw. App. 1990) (An
order

awarding

attorney

fees

but

v.

Mortgage

not

setting

the

amount

is

appealable).
In Baldwin

Bright

9

Company,

757 P. 2d 1072 (Colo.

1988) the Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari
state's Court of Appeals' decision,

to review that

The intermediate appellate

court had ruled that an appeal of a decision on the merits was
nonfinal and nonappealable, because the trial court had expressly
reserved the determination of the amount of attorney fees for later
decision.
Baldwin
Co.,

486

relied heavily on Budinich

U.S.

196,

100

L.Ed.2d

v.

Bectom

178, 108

Dickinson

S.Ct.

1717

and
(1988),

discussed above and attached as Appendix 3.
Nevertheless, we believe the that a bright line rule that
a decision on the merits is a final judgment for appeal
purposes despite any outstanding issue of attorney fees
is necessary and appropriate. Such a rule will permit
litigants to comply with the relevant appellate rules
without a case-by-case analysis of the relationship of
attorney fees to the relief sought and will avoid
uncertainty. If judgment has been entered and only the
issue of attorney fees remains to be determined,
certification
pursuant
to Rule
54(b)
is not a
prerequisite to appellate review of the merits of the
case.
We hold that a final judgment on the merits is appealable
regardless of any unresolved issue of attorney fees, and
we therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals
and remand with directions to reinstate the petitioner's
appeal.
Baldwin,

757 P.2d at 1074, emphasis supplied.

Idaho has likewise followed the rule adopted by the aborted
Allen

Steel

decision of Utah's Supreme Court.

122 Idaho 702, 838 P.2d 305 (Idaho App. 1991).
case

Thompson

v.

"In the present

. . . the district court's decision and dismissal
10

Pike,

order

resolved all substantive issues raised in the litigation, leaving
only the question of an award of costs and attorney fees for
further determination.

For the purposes of appeal, the dismissal

order was a 'final judgment'. . .
In Snodgrass

v.

State

."

Id., 838 P.2d at 308.

Farm Mutual

Auto

Ins.,

789 P.2d 211

(Kan. 1990) (following federal court decisions), the Kansas Court
of Appeals' ruling that it had no jurisdiction was reversed.

M

A

decision on the merits is final for purposes of appeal even if a
request or motion for attorney fees attributable to the case has
not yet been determined."
Bradley

v.

Oregon

Trail

Id., 838 P. 2d at 213, 215.
Sav.

& Loan Assoc,

Accord,

47 Or.App. 871, 617

P.2d 263, 268-69 (Ore. App. 1980).

5.

Since

jurisdiction.

the

initial

order was

final, the Court has

The appeal should be reviewed on its merits, as

exhaustively briefed by the parties and the agency. And this being
the case, McCord is probably not a "prevailing party" and the
attorney fee award should also fail.

6.

Even if the first appeal was premature, it is valid. The

other rule the parties and Court Panel failed to properly consider,
is Rule 4(c), Utah R. App. P.

Essentially, the Court ruled that

the first appeal was too early, and the second one too late. Rule
11

4 makes the appeal valid, effective when it should have been filed.
That rule states,
Except as provided in paragreiph (b) of this rule, a
notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of the
judgment or order of the trial court shall be treated as
filed after such entry and on the day thereof.
Id.

Should the Court stick by its determination that the first

appeal was premature, this is precisely what happened here and the
rule

applies.

The

appeal

is

effective

as

of

the

date

the

Supplemental Order relating to attorney fees was entered (September
10, 1991).
Although timely notice of appeal is jurisdictional, . .
. premature filing of the notice of appeal does not
deprive this Court of jurisdiction where the final
judgment entered is in accord with the ruling appealed
from and no post-judgment motions have been made.
CMC Cassity,

Inc.

v.

Aird,

707

P. 2d

1304,

1305

(Utah

1985)

(citations omitted).

7.

There

is no need

to revisit Heinecke.

Department of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459 (Utah App. 1991).

Heinecke v.
In footnote

4 of the Opinion, the Court suggested it might revisit that case at
the request of the Industrial Commission.
The Commission makes out no convincing argument as to why the
Court should reverse itself, in derogation of the two year old
expectations of Maverik and other litigants similarly situated.
12

The Commission seeks to ignore the clear wording difference between
the various administrative

review statutes, and to turn all

instances in which parties "may" seek review in the agency into
mandatory agency review, despite the lack of mandatory language.
Under Section 63-46b-16 (4) (d) , Utah Code the Court may grant
relief

from

interpreted
Chevron

v.

agency
or

action

applied

Utah State

the

if

the

agency

has

law", prejudicing

Tax Commission,

29, 1993) (citation omitted) .

"erroneously

the appellant.

2 07 Utah Adv. Rep. 2 3 (Jan.

"We do not defer to an agency's

statutory interpretation unless the legislature has explicitly, or
implicitly,

granted

the

agency

discretion

to

interpret

the

statutory language at issue." Id. There is no such grant here.
The Commission's attack on Heinecke
negative logic.

arises

largely from

"There is no reason for this Court to conclude .

. . that U.C.A. Sections 63-46b-12(1)(a) and 14(2A) cannot be read
together to require Maverik to exhaust its administrative remedies
prior to filing a judicial appeal."

Response Br. at 31.

In

essence, the Commission asks the Court to reword the statute; to
make "may" mean "shall", and to narrowly circumscribe jurisdiction
because it can think of no reason not to do so.

Br. at 31.

Statutory language is not so lightly cast aside. The agency should
petition the legislature for the change, not this Court.
Heinecke was discussed without reversal or even criticism just
13

last year.
Licensing,

Barney

v.

Division

of

Occupational

and

Professional

828 P. 2d 542, 544 (Utah 1992) (administrative review

prior to judicial appeal is optional).

8.

No judgment amount has been entered.

Never in all its

orders has there been a definite judgment amount entered.

For the

Court to do anything but allow this appeal leaves this case in
limbo, and Maverik and McCord are left without knowing how much
Maverik would owe McCord.9
In the event the Court disregards all the foregoing arguments
and maintains that it is without jurisdiction to hear the first
appeal, the second one is well taken.

How can Maverik's Request

for Review be a day late, if there was never an order setting the
judgment amount?

CONCLUSION
If correct legal principals are looked to, the first appeal
must be within this Court's jurisdiction, and the second was not
late.

The appeal should be reinstated and determined on its

9

It is doubtful McCord would accept or the Commission would
issue a satisfaction based on a check made payable to McCord for
"in the range of $8,000."
14

merits.10
The leading case in the area was ignored by McCord and the
Agency throughout the agency and appeal levels of this case.

This

Court should take the opportunity to construe and apply it.

Salt

Lake

City

Corp.

v.

Confer,

674 P.2d 632 (Utah 1983).

This issue

alone is dispositive and requires reversal, because the ALJ applied
the wrong legal standard to determine whether there was handicap
discrimination.
Handicap discrimination may only occur if the work at issue is
found to be a "major life activity".

Section 34-35-6, Utah Code.

The Commission's position11 is that all jobs, without regard to

10

Some of the problems with the merits include:
a. The Commission's refusal to consider whether McCord's loss
of her part time convenience store clerking job can be a
substantial interference with a major life activity;
b. How to reconcile the fact that McCord got a higher paying
job just two weeks after leaving Maverik, a job she later quit
because of "health reasons", with an award of a couple of years of
back-pay and thousands of dollars in attorney fees;
c. why Maverik should suffer when, in delaying the proceeding
for over two years, the Commission violated Section 34-357.1(3)(b), Utah Code;
d. how the Court can do anything but reverse the Commission,
when it has itself changed its mind about the finality of the first
order appealed from;
e. how McCord can win a handicap discrimination action with
no medical evidence (except a definition of the condition she
claims to have).
11

The issue of the meaning of "major life activity" is a
question of statutory construction.
In such an issue, no
particular deference is given to the agency's interpretation of the
15

their nature or whether they are full or part time, are major life
activities.12
Respectfully submitted this 17th day of June, 1993.

Ronald C. Barker
Mitchell R. Barker
David C. Cundick

CERTIFICATION OF COUNSEL
We hereby certify that this Petition is in good faith, and is
not filed for the purpose of delay.

Mitchell R. Barker

statute. Chevron v. Utah State
23 (Jan. 29, 1993); Belnorth

Tax Commission,
2 07 Utah Adv. Rep.
Petroleum
Corp.
v.
State
Tax

Commission,
204 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, 30 (Utah App. 1993). This a
true a fortiori
here, since the Confer case already interpreted the
statute in a way contrary to the agency's application.
12

Importantly, this is not a factual issue, but an example of
the ALJ refusing to apply the standard imposed by the Utah courts.
The Commission refused to even acknowledge the existence of Confer,
much less to follow its requirement that it determine whether
McCord's part time convenience store clerking job was a "major life
activity11. Id. at 63 6.
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BILLINGS, Presiding Judge:
Maverik Country Stores brings separate appeals from two
decisions of the Industrial Commission of Utah. The first appeal
is from the Industrial Commission's determination that Maverik
violated Utah Code Ann. §§ 34-35-1 to -8 (1988 & Supp. 1993), the
Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, in its treatment of Vicky Ann
McCord. The second appeal is from the Industrial Commission's
ruling that Maverik's request for agency review was untimely. We
dismiss the first appeal and affirm the ruling in the second.
FACTS
Ms. Jones, a Maverik store manager, hired Ms. McCord as a
convenience store clerk on September 30, 1988.l McCord worked
1. Because Appellant does not challenge the factual findings of
the Industrial Commission, we recite the facts in accord with
(...continued)

1991 decision included a specific reservation of the issue of
appropriate attorney fees. On September 10, 1991, the ALJ issued
a Supplemental Order disposing of the issue of attorney fees.
On July 26, 1991, Maverik filed a Writ of Review with this
court (first appeal). The first appeal is from the ALJ's Order
of June 26, 1991. On August 26, 1991, McCord and the Industrial
Commission filed motions to dismiss the first appeal based on
Maverik's failure to exhaust administrative remedies and lack of
a final order. On September 16, 1991, this court ordered those
motions deferred, and requested the parties include arguments on
those issues in their briefs on the merits•
Despite its pending appeal, Maverik then filed a Request for
Review by the Industrial Commission of the ALJ's June 26, 1991
and September 10, 1991 Orders. The date the request was filed is
unclear. Counsel for Maverik signed and dated the request
October 10, 1991. The request has two received dates stamped on
it, October 11, 1991 and October 15, 1991. In later orders
referring to the request, the Industrial Commission refers to
both dates as the day it received the request. For the purposes
of our review, we assume the request was received October 11,
1991.
On February 28, 1992, the Industrial Commission denied
Maverik's Request for Review based on its untimeliness.2 On
March 19, 1992, Maverik filed a request with the Industrial
Commission to reconsider its denial of the Request for Review.
On March 30, 1992, the Industrial Commission denied Maverik's
Request for Reconsideration. In this denial, the Industrial
Commission recognized it could have allowed the late Request for
Review if Maverik had shown good cause for extension of the time
period. The Industrial Commission ruled, however, that Maverik
had failed to show good cause for the extension.
On April 3, 1992, Maverik filed a "Limited Request for
Reconsideration11 in which it finally attempted to show good cause
for its late filing of the original Request for Review. The
Industrial Commission did not respond to this unique motion. On
April 7, 1992, Maverik filed a Writ of Review with this court
(second appeal). The second appeal is from the Industrial
Commission's Order Denying Review and Order Denying Request For
Reconsideration.
2. In the Order denying the Request for Review, the Industrial
Commission also addressed and rejected Maverik's claims on the
merits. Because of our ultimate conclusion, we need not and do
not comment on the propriety of the Industrial Commission's
disposition on the merits.

We, therefore, have no jurisdiction over the first appeal and
must dismiss it.4
THE SECOND APPEAL
A.

Industrial Commission's Jurisdiction

Maverik contends the filing of the first appeal, regardless
of its timeliness, divested the Industrial Commission of
jurisdiction to continue to act in the case. Thus, according to
Maverik, every action taken by the Industrial Commission after
the ALJ's June 2 6 Order is a nullity. Maverik would have us
remand to the Industrial Commission for entry of the Supplemental
Order on attorney fees and the agency appeals process. Maverik
does not provide any relevant authority supporting this
contention.
Other courts have consistently recognized an appeal from a
non-final order does not divest the administrative tribunal of
4. Because we find there was no final order prior to the first
appeal, we do not reach the issue of whether we also lack
jurisdiction because Maverik failed to exhaust its administrative
remedies. The Industrial Commission asks us to revisit our
decision in Heinecke v. Department of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459
(Utah App. 1991) , where we focused on the language of Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b-12(1)(a) (1989) and held a petitioner need not
avail himself of a review permitted by agency rule prior to
filing an appeal to this court. We distinguished such permissive
review from review which is statutorily mandated. Id. at 462.
See also Hi-Country Homeowners Assoc, v. Public Service Comm'n,
779 P.2d 682, 684 (Utah 1989) (holding all mandatory reviews must
be exhausted prior to judicial appeal).
In Heinecke, however, we did not address the impact of
another section of UAPA which provides: "A party may seek
judicial review only after exhausting all administrative remedies
available . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2) (1989)
(emphasis added). See also Tax Comm'n v. Iverson, 782 P„2d 519,
524 n.3 (Utah 1989) (citing section 63-46b-14 for proposition
petitioner must exhaust administrative remedies prior to judicial
review). According to the Industrial Commission section 63-46b14(2) requires a party to utilize all permissive review prior to
filing an administrative appeal. While we express no opinion
today on that issue, we do note Heinecke was rendered without the
benefit of briefing by counsel. Heinecke, 810 P.2d at 462.
Further, we specifically recognized we might revisit the issue at
an appropriate point in the future. Id. at 464 n.6. That day
still awaits.

n o n o r\c —n
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B.

Timeliness

McCord and the Industrial Commission argue we should dismiss
the second appeal because Maverik's Request for Review of the
Final Order of the ALJ was untimely, Maverik responds its
Request for Review was timely because either (1) Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 6(e) gives it three extra days to file the
appeal, (2) the filing date is the date of mailing or, (3) the
Industrial Commission abused its discretion in failing to extend
the filing deadline by one day. The Final Order was issued
September 10, 1991 and Maverik filed its Request for Review
October 11, 1991. Whether URCP 6(e) is applicable or whether the
crucial date is the mailing date are questions that involve the
agency's application or interpretation of general law which we
review under section 63-46b-16(4)(d) for correction of error.
Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div.. 814 P.2d 581, 587-89 (Utah
1991); King v. Industrial Comm'n. 209 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, 34 (Utah
App. 1993). See also SEMECO v. Auditing Div., 209 Utah Adv. Rep.
73, 76 (Utah 1993) (Durham, J., dissenting).
1. Date of Filing
UAPA provides a request for review must be filed "within 3 0
days after the issuance of the order . . . ." Utah Code Ann. §
63-46b-12(1)(a) (1988). The request must also "be sent by mail
to the presiding officer and to each party." Id. § 63-46b12(1)(b)(iv). The parties agree the ALJ's final Order was dated
and issued September 10, 1991. See Dusty's Inc. v. Auditing
Div., 842 P.2d 868, 870 (Utah 1992) (holding administrative order
is issued on date on face of order).
Maverik first argues that Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 6(e)
gives it a three day extension on the thirty day filing deadline.
That rule provides: "Whenever a party . . . is required to do
some act . . . within a prescribed period after the service of a
notice . . . upon him and the notice . . . is served by mail, 3
days shall be added to the prescribed period." Utah R. Civ. P.
6(e) (emphasis added). That rule must be read in light of
section 63-46b-12(1)(a) of UAPA which requires a party to appeal
thirty days after the issuance of the administrative ruling.
Thus, Rule 6(e) does not apply because under section 63-46b12(1)(a) of UAPA the time for appeal runs from the issuance of an
order not from the service of an order on a party.
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in section 63-46b-12 requires, as a prerequisite to the agency
taking jurisdiction over a review, actual delivery of the
necessary documents to the agency within the thirty day time
limit,.
3. Extension of Filing Deadline
Maverik next argues the Industrial Commission abused its
discretion by failing to grant a one day extension of the filing
deadline. Maverik does not identify the portion of 63-46b-16(4)
under which it asks us to review this claim. See King v.
Industrial Comm'n. 209 Utah Adv* Rep, 33, 35 n.6 (Utah App. March
18, 1993) (encouraging counsel to clearly identify the portion of
63-46b-16(4) under which review is sought). Because the
authority to grant an extension in a filing deadline is not in an
agency-specific statute, but rather a general provision of UAPA,
and because Maverik is arguing an abuse of discretion standard,
it appears Maverik is necessarily seeking review under Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv) (1988). That catch-all portion of
section 63-46b-16(4) provides we can grant relief if the agency
action is "arbitrary or capricious." Id. We review agency
action under this section for reasonableness. Anderson v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 839 P.2d 822, 824 (Utah 1992). See also SEMECO v.
Auditing Div., 209 Utah Adv. Rep. 73, 78 (Utah 1993) (Durham, J.,
dissenting).
a. The Original Request for Reconsideration
For an agency to extend any deadline established under UAPA
the petitioner must show good cause. See Utah Code Ann. § 6346b-l(9) (1988). In its Request for Reconsideration, Maverik
made no attempt to show good cause. The Industrial Commission,
in its Order denying the Request for Reconsideration,
specifically notes Maverik's failure to show good cause. Thus,
the Industrial Commission's decision denying Maverik a one day
extension is not unreasonable in light of Maverik's complete
failure to articulate any facts on which to base a good cause
determination.
b. The Second Request for Reconsideration
In a document captioned "Limited Request for
Reconsideration" filed April 3, 1992, six days after the original
Request for Reconsideration was denied and four days before the
second appeal was filed, Maverik finally attempts to show good
cause. There is no authorization for a "Limited Request for
Reconsideration" in UAPA. Counsel's failure to comply with the
rules which set forth the requirements for getting an extension
of the filing deadline does not give him the right to create

CONCLUSION
Maverik's first appeal was brought from a non-final Order of
the Industrial Commission. Maverik's second appeal was brought
from a reasonable ruling of the Industrial Commission that
Maverik's Request for Review was untimely. Thus, we dismiss case

9.

(...continued)
Within 2 0 days after the date that an order
is issued for which review by the agency or
by a superior agency under Section 63-46b-12
is unavailable, and if the order would
otherwise constitute final agency action, any
party may file a written request for
reconsideration with the agency . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(1)(a) (1989) (emphasis added). This
section provides a petitioner with the option of applying to the
agency for reconsideration or appealing to the courts. It does
not provide a petitioner the opportunity to pursue both routes
concurrently. The emphasized language indicates a petitioner who
decides to file a request for reconsideration no longer has a
"final agency action" from which to appeal. The petitioner must
wait until the request is either responded to in writing or
denied by operation of law. Section 63-46b-13(1)(a) provides a
request for reconsideration is not a mandatory step in exhausting
administrative remedies or reaching "finality" to give the courts
jurisdiction over an appeal. It is a permissive step.
Petitioners who choose to take advantage of this step must
thereafter accept the consequences, one of which is that an
appeal to the judicial system cannot be made until the agency
acts on the request.
Thus, the second request for reconsideration would have
given the Industrial Commission another opportunity to address
the merits. Therefore, as of April 7, 1992, Maverik would have
no final order from which to appeal. Under this analysis, the
second appeal would be brought from a non-final order over which
we have no jurisdiction and we would dismiss it.
Further, the window for Maverik to file an appeal from the
Industrial Commission's denial of the second request would have
been from April 23, 1992 to May 23, 1992. Thus, under either
analysis, Maverik is left without judicial review of the merits.
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WE CONCUR:
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice
I. Daniel Stewart, Justice
Christine M. Durham, Justice
1. See, however, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
58A(d)» which requires the prevailing party to promptly give notice of the signing or entry of judgment to all other parties and to file proof of service
of such notice with the clerk of the court.
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: (Concurring In the
Result)
! concur in the disposition of the case made by
the majority. However, I depart from the majority
in my appraisal of the level of scrutiny the trial
court gave the findings of fact and conclusions of
law prepared by counsel for Tel-Tech.
It is certainly true that a trial judge need not
make any emendations in proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law to demonstrate that he
or she has not abdicated the decision-making
function to the lawyer who prepared the document. However, here the court signed proposed
findings that included a statement that "[n]o evidence was introduced at trial ... of a surety bond"
when this was not the case, and a ruling that
exhibits previously admitted should be rejected, a
ruling which was manifestly incorrect. Moreover,
at the time the trial court asked the parties to
submit their proposed findings, the court had not
decided how the case was to come out; therefore,
the parties had no guidance from the trial court as
to how to craft their findings. It can be assumed
that as a result, each party prepared findings that
were favorable to it on all points, The foregoing
facts give me pause and suggest that the trial court
may have been less than assiduous in reviewing the
proposed findings, perhaps simply signing those
proposed by the party that prevailed on the basic
issues.
Trial judges are certainly entitled to ask the
assistance of counsel in preparing findings of fact
and conclusions of law. There is some danger that
in the press of business, they may come to rely too
heavily on these proposals and inadvertently
permit counsel to inject findings that may not be
entirely in conformity with the judge's views or
that may deal with issues the judge has not even
thought about.
The finding of facts 'is an important part of the
judicial function,* one that is designed to flesh out
the rationale for the decision and one that "the
judge cannot surrender ... to counsel." 9 Wright &
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §2578, at
705 (1971) [hereinafter Wright and Miller], As the
United States Supreme Court has noted, findings
of fact prepared by the court are "drawn with the
insight of a disinterested mind" and* are "more
helpful to the appellate court" than those prepared
by counsel. United States v. EJ Paso Natural Oas
Co., 376 U.S. 651, 656 (1964). It is for this reason
that the federal courts appear to have almost uniformly adopted the rule that while findings prepared by counsel are sufficient under the federal
analogue to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52,
appellate courts 'will feel freer in close cases to
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disregard a finding or remand for further findings
if the triaJ court did not prepare them him [or her]
self." 9 Wright & Miller, at 707; see Utah R. Civ.
P. 52(a); see, e.g., Ramey Constr. Co. v. Apache
Tribe of MescaJero Reservation, 616 F.2d 464
(10th Cir. 1980]; Kelson v. United States, 503 F.2d
1291 (10th Cir. 1974).
I know that I apply a similar standard in reviewing findings prepared by counsel, and I suspect
that other members of this Court do the same,
although to my knowledge, we have never said so.
In light of this fact and the rule stated above, trial
courts would be well advised to be vigilant in
guarding against the tendency to view findings as a
detail to be dealt with as expeditiously as possible,
rather than as a fundamental pan of the decisional
process, one that goes to the heart of its integrity.
In the same vein, counsel preparing proposed findings and conclusions should be cautious lest in
their zeal, they incude proposals that may undermine the integrity of the judgment they hope to
obtain.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ALLEN STEEL C O M P A N Y , a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
CROSSROADS PLAZA ASSOCIATES, a
Utah Joint venture, The Equitable Life
Assurance Society of the United States, a New
York corporation, and Okland-Foulger
Company, a general partnership, Deseret Title
Holding Corporation, a Utah corporation, et
•I..
Defendants and Appellants.
N o . 20532
FILED: October 6, 1989
Third District, Salt Lake County
Honorable Scott Daniels
ATTORNEYS:
Joseph J. Palmer, H. Dennis Piercey, SaJt
Lake City, for Allen Steel
Bruce A. Maak, Thomas B. Green, Clark
Waddoups, Salt Lake City, for Crossroads
Plaza and Equitable Life Assurance,
Wilford A. Beesley, Jack Fairclough, Salt
Lake City, for Okland-Foulger
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
STEWART, Justice:
Plaintiff Allen Steel Company ('Allen Steel")
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CODfCO
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Auen 5ieeJ uo. v. Crossroads Plaza Associates 7 /

7/

119 Utah Adv Rep 6

brought this action against defendants Crossroads
Plaza Associates ('Crossroads'), Equitable Life
Assurance Society of the United States
( ' E q u i t a b l e * ) , O k i a n d - F o u l g e r Company
('Okiand-Foulger') and various other landowner
defendants. The complaint sought a judgment
against Okiand-Foulger for the unpaid amount
on a construction contract between Allen Steel and
Okiand-Foulger, a judgment against the remaining defendant for their failure as leaseholders of
the land where the building was erected to obtain a
contractor's bond, and a judgment of foreclosure
of a mechanic's lien Crossroads, Equitable, and
Okiand-Foulger • counter claimed, seeking both an
offset against Alien Steel's contractual claims and
tort damages for an alleged defective design of the
project by Allen Steel. In addition, Equitable crossclaimed against Okiand-Foulger.
The trial court entered a judgment for $579,294,
plus interest, in favor of Allen Steel and against
Okiand-Foulger, Crossroads, and Equitable and
granted Allen Steel's request for foreclosure of its
mechanic's lien. The court also awarded Allen
Steel a deficiency judgment against OkiandFoulger for the judgment, costs, and attorney fees.
The court denied Allen Steel's request for consequential damages, including delay damages,
against Okiand-Foulger, Crossroads, and Equitable. The trial judge also ruled that the mechanic's hen was not effective against the fee interests of the remaining defendant landowners and
ordered Allen Steel to pay the landowners' attorney fees and costs in an amount to be determined
at a further proceeding. Finally, the trial court
awarded Equitable a judgment for damages on its
cross-claim against Okiand-Foulger under their
joint venture agreement, but held that the amount
of such damages should be determined in a subsequent proceeding. The court certified the case fpr
appeal pursuant to the provisions of Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure 54(b).
Crossroads, Equitable, and Okiand-Foulger
appeal the judgment against them and the trial
court's dismissal of their counterclaims. Allen
Steel cross-appeals the trial court's refusal to
enforce its mechanic's lien against the landowners,
the denial of delay damages against the developers,
and the refusal of the trial court to hold Equitable
and Crossroads personally liable for attorney fees.
Allen Steel docs not appeal the trial court's award
of attorney fees to the landowners and against
Allen Steel. Nor does Okiand-Foulger appeal the
award of attorney fees to Allen Steel.
I. FACTS
Equitable and Okiand-Foulger created Crossroads Plaza Associates, a joint venture that U the
owner of a leasehold interest on which the Crossroads Plaza shopping mall, office building, and
parking garage in Salt Lake City, Utah, are built.
The real property upon* which the project is
located consists of separate contiguous parcels of
realty separately owned at the time this action
arose by Dcscret Title Holding Corporation, Salt
Lake City corporation, and various other entities
('landowners'), each of whom leased its interest to
Crossroads.
The joint venture planned to build a 660,000-
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square-foot, four-story shopping mall, a sixteenr{fii
story office building, and an eight-story, 2,500/
cax parking garage complex. The joint venture
\J,
agreement placed responsibility for construction .
and 'architectural and design* functipns on ^ ^
(
Okiand-Foulger 'to prepare and fmalue comp>
lete plans and specifications ... subject to being
7*
approved by the venturers.' For these responsibi- y<
lities, Okiand-Foulger received a design fee of
'
approximately SI.4 million, h hired Timmcrman/
Stephan Associates to provide architectural services for $227,000.
In the fall of 1977, Okiand-Foulger advertised
for 'design-build* bids on the structural steej
work for the Crossroads project, excluding footings and foundations. Allen Steel bid on the
project. It was told that the structural steel work
was to comply with the Uniform Building Code
(1976 ed.). Allen Steel retained Joseph Patrick, a
structural engineer, to prepare a preliminary design
of the tower for bidding purposes and promised to
pay him $25,000 for the work if Allen Steel
secured the bid. Patrick prepared a preliminary
structural design using a hambro joist system,
wmch was sufficiently detailed to allow Allen Steel
to make a bid. Allen Steel submitted the bid to
Okiand-Foulger in the form of a proposal dated
November 1, 1977, and Okiand-Foulger rejected
it.
Subsequently. Patrick prepared a second proposal which included three structural alternatives, a
bar joist system, a hambro joist system, and a
composite metal deck system. Allen Steel submitted the second proposal to Okiand-Foulger on
January 11, 1978. The bid proposal made clear
that the 'Owner's engineer* was to accept overall
•responsibility for the design.* It provided, in
part;
This proposal is offered for the
design, fabrication, and ejection of the
Structural Elements only for the Tower
and Mall- The following design parameters have been used for the structural design suggested by our engineers
to compute the price, Owner's engineer
is to check this design and make
changes if necessary to enable him to
accept overall responsibility for design.
Changes that effect [sic] quantity,
weight, or complexity of structural
members will require an adjustment in
price.
(Emphasis added.)
In March, 1978, Allen Steel met with OklandFou.lger, and Okiand-Foulger indicated that the
composite metal deck alternative had been chosen.
Allen Steel reduced its unit price. On March 3,
I97fi, Okiand-Foulger sent a letter to Alien Steel,
stating:
This letter is to inform you of our
intent, upon the closing of the construction loan for Crossroads Plaza, to
enter into an agreement with Allen
Steel Company, to provide the structural steel and metal deck for' said
project, in accordance with your pro-
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posal
We understand, in turn, that Allen
Steel will make tentative agreements
with their suppliers at this time, to
insure that the above mentioned proposal will be maintained
It is of some significance that on March 4, 1978,
Joseph Patrick wrote to Okland-Foulger, offering to provide engineering services in connection
with the footing foundation of the project, and
Okland-Foulger accepted his offer

1>
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upon the posting of a bond
Salt Lake City halted construction of the Crossroads Plaza Tower on October 16, 1978, because
of inadequacies it believed existed in the design of
the structure The basic defect according to an
engineer hired by the City was that the shear uall
did not compi) with the Uniform Building Cade
At that time, eight stories had been erected
Okland-Foulger hired Glen Enke to provide a
remedial engineering design to correct the defect
Allen Steel and Okland-Foulger agreed that Allen
Steel would finish the contract and perform the
remedial work Pursuant to Glen Enke's revised
design, work commenced in March, 1979, and the
tower was finished in January, 1980 The revision
required strengthening and enlarging the base
plates and the stee! column and beam connections
so that seismic forces would be absorbed through
the steel structure itself In the process, three previously erected stones of reinforced steel had to be
torn down
Okland-Foulger continued regular progress
payments to Allen Steel until Allen Steel completed performance of the project and then withheld
the final $579,294 payment owed Allen Steel
Okland-Foulger also asserted a backcharge of
over $2,000,000 for losses due to the expense and
delay of redesigning and reconstructing the stiuctural elements of the project Allen Steel filed a
hen in May, 1980, within eighty days of OklandFoulgcr's refusal to pay the amount due on the
contract and thereafter initiated this action to
collect the balance due on its contract with OklandFoulger or, in the alternative, to collect firom
Equitable, Crossroads, and the landowners based
upon their failure to provide payment bonds.
Crossroads, Equitable, and Okland-Foulger filed
counterclaims against Allen Steel, asserting both
an offset against Allen Steel's claims and an independent ground for recovery of damages based
on the defective design of the tower structure
Equitable filed a cross-claim against OklandFoulger, seeking damages for the defective design
from Okland-Foulger pursuant to the joint
venture agreement between them
For purposes of this lawsuit only, the parties
stipulated that the design of the structural elements
of the tower section of the Crossroads project did
not comply with the Uniform Building Code (1976
Ed ) and fell below the ordinary standard of care
for structural engineers in the Salt Lake County,
Utah area during 1977 and 1978 in the following
specific respects
(a) The design was not adequate to
accommodate and withstand lateral
(including torsional) forces induced by
seismic and wind forces
(b) The design of the manner by which
the two halves of the shear wall were
connected together was not adequate to
enable the two halves of the shear wall,
as a connected unit, to withstand shear
forces induced by seismic or wind
forces.
(c) The mat footing for the tower structure was not sufficiently stiff to
resist overturning forces induced in the

In June, 1978, Okland-Foulger authorized
Allen Steel to begin detailing, i c , preparing detailed template-hkc plans for the fabncation of
steel Throughout this time, Joseph Patrick
worked on the design and consulted from tunc to
time with both Allen Steel and Okland-Foulger.
The design prepared by Patnck included a reinforced concrete mat that served as the foundation
for the tower The design also included a structural steel design and a concrete shear wall The
shear wall consisted of a concrete shaft formed by
two bracket-shaped structures facing each other
and joined together with structural steel to make a
rectangular reinforcing framework thirty feet
square and extending the enure height of the building The shear wall was to house the elevator
shaft and resist lateral forces imposed on the building by either wind or earthquake
On August 1, 1978, Allen Steel submitted the
completed detail drawings to Okland-Foulger for
approval, and Okland-Foulger submitted the
design drawings to Equitable for review Equitablc's engineer questioned some areas of the
design, and as a result, the concrete mat was increased in thickness by one foot Although Equitable did not formally approve or disapprove the
plans, Okland-Foulger authorized Allen Steel to
proceed with fabrication based on the plans.
Dunng the course of construction, OklandFoulger dealt directly wrth Patrick regarding concrete tests, weld tests, elevator area design, tenant
improvements, and other details In its findings of
fact, the trial court found that Patnck performed
some of his functions at the request of Allen Steel,
others at the request of Okland-Foulger, and
others at the request of both Generally, however,
Patrick's manner of performing the work and his
hours and places of work were not controlled by
either Allen Steel or Okland-Foulger OklandFoulger delivered a proposed subcontract form to
Allen Steel on September 5, 1978 Robert Allen of
Allen Steel stated that he would have his attorney
review the document and then he would sign it,
but the agreement was never signed
Some two weeks later, on September 20, 1978,
Allen Steel received a letter from Utah American
Steel Company, which was fabricating the steel
members, questioning the design of the structure,
and on October 9, 1978, Allen Steel spoke to
Patrick regarding the structural design and showed
him the letter from Utah American Steel At that
time, Patnck showed Allen Steel a letter from the
Salt Lake City Engineer's office questioning the
design The same day, a meeting was held between
Salt Lake City Corporation and Okland-Foulger
in which the City questioned the design but agreed
to allow Okland-Foulger to continue construction
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mat footing by the shear wall (which
involved, the court may direct the entry
was connected to the mat footing)
of a final judgment as to one or more
when the shear wall itself is subjected
but fewer than all of the claims or
to horizontal forces
parties only upon an express determiA non-jury trial commenced in June, 1984
nation by the court that there is no just
During trial, the court ordered the issue of
reason for delay and upon an express
damages to be severed and tried separately after
direction for the entry of judgment
the determination of the liability issues Following
Even though a judgment is certified pursuant to
a month-long trial, the trial court entered findRule 54 and all parties pursue the appeal, that is
ings of fact and conclusions of law The court held
not sufficient to confer jurisdiction Olson v SaJt
that the contract between Allen Steel and OklandLake City School District, 724 P 2d 960, 964
Fouiger was embodied in Allen Steel's January 11,
(Utah 1986), held that 'acquiescence of the parties
1978 proposal to Okland-Foulger The trial court
is insufficient to confer jurisdiction * It is essential
also concluded that the language in the contract
that the ruling "wholly dispose of the claim or the
'effectively excluded any warranty for the design
party* to be certified as final and appealable under
Therefore, Allen Steel is not liable to OklandRule 54(b) 724 P 2d at 964, see also Pate v
Foulger or Crossroads Plaza Associates for breach
Marathon Steel Co , 692 P 2d 765 (Utah 1984)
of contract * The trial court further held that
All the claims between Allen Steel and defend"Joseph Patrick was an independent contractor
ants were fully and finally litigated Allen Steel
and Allen Steel is not liable in tort to Oklandwon on us claim against defendants Crossroads,
Foulger for his negligence
* Based on these
Okland-Foulger, and Equitable and on the couconclusions, the trial court ruled that "Allen Steel
nterclaims against it Allen Steel lost on its hen
satisfactorily completed its contract and is entitled
claim against the landowner defendants There still
to be paid for its work * The court entered a
remain, however, (1) Equitable's damages on its
judgment in favor of Allen Steel m the amount of
cross<laim against Okland-Foulger, and (2) the
$579,294 plus interest and against Crossroads
amount of attorney fees due Allen Steel and the
Plaza Associates, Equitable, and Okland-Foulger
landowners Equitable's claim against Oklandand dismissed defendants' counterclaims against
Foulger is a separate, independent claim filed as a
Allen Steel for an offset and damages for negligent
cross-claim, to which Allen Steel is not a party
design
The question here is whether the unresolved attoThe court held Crossroads Plaza Associates and
rney fee issues with respect to Allen Steel's judgEquitable liable for their failure to furnish a
ment and the landowner's judgment against Allen
payment bond for the project The court also Steel make those judgments nonfinal under Rule
ruled that Allen Steel's mechanic's lien was valid
14(b)
as against defendants Okland-Foulger, Equitable,
Not one of our previous cases has expressly
and Crossroads and authorized Allen Steel to ruled on the specific issue of whether the deferral
foreclose its hen securing the contract balance The of awarding attorney fees makes a judgment
court also held that Allen Steel could not enforce
nonfinal and therefore noncertifiable under Rule
its hen against the landowners' property because
54(b) See, eg , Elder v Tnax Co , 740 P 2d 1320
they were not parties to a contract with Allen Steel
(Utah 1987), Anvca Mut Ins v Schettler, 738
and there was no evidence that they would benefit
P 2d 641 (Utah 1987), Olson v Salt Uke Cuy
from the construction of the project at the end of
School Dist, 724 P 2d %0 (Utah 1986), General
the leases The trial court also entered a judgment
Motors Acceptance Corp v Martinez, 712 P 2d
for attorney fees in favor of Allen Steel and
243 (Utah 1985) See generally, Williams v Statet
against the developers and in favor of the lando716 P 2d 806 (Utah 1986), Pate v Marathon Steel
wners and against Allen Steel
C o , 692 P 2d 765 (Utah 1984)
On appeal, Okland Foulger, Equitable, and
Rule 54(b) is identical in all material respects to
Crossroads assert that the trial court erred in
the corresponding federal rule, and in construing
holding that (!) Allen Steel was not liable for
our rules, we look to authorities which have intebreach of warranty, and (2) Allen Steel was not
rpreted the federal rule Olson, 724 P 2d at 965
liable for negligence in providing a defective
n 5, Pate, 692 P 2d at 767 n 1 At federal law, a
design Allen Steel asseru on cross-appeal that
pending claim for attorney fees does not make a
(1) it was entitled to a mechanic's hen against the
judgment on the menu, nonappealable See Bcaudry
fee interests of the landowners, (2) the trial court
Motor Co
v Abko Properties,
Inc , 780
erred in denying delay damages to Allen Steel, and
F2d 751, 755 (9th C\t), cert denied, 479 U S
(3) the judgment should state unambiguously that
825 (1986) ('Rule 54(b) has no application to
Equitable and Crossroads are personally liable for
motions for attorneys' fees *), Exchange Nar'i
attorney fees
Bank v Daniels, 763 F 2d 286, 292, a/Td on
rehearing, 768 F 2d 140 (7th Or 1985) CIA)
II. FINALITY
judgment on the merits is a p p e a l a b l e - After oral argument, the Court requested the
independently of Rule 54(b)-despu« the fact
panics to submit supplemental briefs on the valithat questions of fees remain •)
dity of the trial court's certification of the judgThe trial court here ruled that the issue of attment pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil
orney
fees could 'best be determined after the
Procedure That rule provides in pertinent part
rights and liabilities of the parties are finally detWhen more than one claim for relief
ermined either by appeal or expiration of appeal
and/or when multiple parties are
time * A similar observation was made in Cinerama, Inc v Sweet Music, S A , 482 F 2d 66, 70
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

Alien Steel Co. v. Crossroads Piaza Associates

10

n 9 Utah Adv Rep. 6

n.2(2dCir. 1973):
Delaying a decision on counsel fees
until after the merits of a case have
been finally determined on appeal may
place a claim for attorneys' fees 'in
much better perspective,* Sprague v.
Ticonic National Bank, [307 U.S. 161,
168 (1939)1; the benefit achieved by an
attorney, the skill he has exhibited in
obtaining it, and the total hours he has
labored are more readily assessable
after the appellate process has run its
course. Moreover, the fact that the
amount of a counsel fee award may
turn on such factors provides support
for the view that the claim for counsel
fees arises out of a separate transaction
or occurrence.
Furthermore, the award of attorney fees usually
includes attorney fees incurred on appeal as well as
at trial. Thus, an actual award of attorney fees
need not be reduced to judgment to make the
judgment final for appeal purposes since the fee*
awarded will often include the fees incurred on the
appeal. In White v.. New Hampshire Department
of Employment Security, 455 U.S. 445, 451-52
(1982), the Court stated:
[Tine court's decision of entitlement to
fees will ... require an inquiry separate
from the decision on the merits-an
inquiry that cannot even commence
until one party has "prevailed.* Nor
can attorney's fees fairly be characterized as an element of 'relief' indistinguishable from other elements....
Their award is uniquely separable from
the cause of action to be proved at
trial.
It follows that even though Allen Steel and the
landowners may still move for a determination of
the amount of attorney fees Qwed them under
judgments now on appeal, this appeal nonetheless
arises out of a final judgment properly certified
under Rule 54(b).
HI. DESiGN-BUILD CONTRACTS
This Court has not previously considered a dispute
involving a 'design-build* contract. A basic
explanation of those contracts is necessary to
understand the legal, economic, and business
environment in which the parties operate when
they enter into such a contract and how and why
the parties deal as they do and with what expectations. In its findings, the trial court entered this
brief explanation of design-build contracts:
'Design build' or 'design construct* is
a term used in the construction industry to denote a method of construction whereby a contractor or subcontractor provides both the design and the
construction of a particular system in
the project. The term is not inflexible,
however, and can mean either that the
contractor has or has not assumed the
ultimate responsibility for the design,
and this can vary from project to
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project.
(Emphasis added.)
A design-build construction contract consists
of an arrangement between an owner and a single
entity for the design and construction of a project,
as contrasted with the traditional construction
process which separates the design and the construction functions. Bynum, Construction Management and Design-Buiid/Fast Track Construction
From the Perspective of a Genera] Contractor, 46
Law & Contemp. Probs. 25, 34 (1983) [hereinafter
Bynum]. The single entity frequently consists of a
joint venture between an architect or engineer and
a general contractor, a design-build firm which
employs both design personnel and contractors, or
a general contracting firm which subcontracts
design work to an architect or engineer. Id. Under
design-build contracts, owners need only look to
one entity for performance. As a result, such
contracts have become increasingly attractive to
owners. Id. They also appeal to design-build
contractors because the contractor is entitled to
both design fees and construction profits. Because
design-build contracts expedite construction, bids
may be made on a "cost-plus' basis, which is
generally less risky for the contractor than a fixed
price contract. Id.
Similarly, although design-build projects may
involve building phases similar to traditional contracts, with the design documents first being
completely prepared and thereafter approved by
the owner, many design-build jobs involve "fast
track" construction, where the designing and
construction are completed simultaneously in
phases. Id. "Fast track' construction may save
substantial time, thereby reducing financing costs
and minimiiing the impact of inflation. Id. That is
especially true where rapid inflation causes (the
actual costs of building materials to outstrip estimated costs under ordinary bidding practices,
thereby producing great risks for subcontractors.
Just as allocation of responsibility' under designbuild contracts differs from the traditional model,
the allocation of liability also diverges from the
traditional model. "It is axiomatic that under a
design-build contract the contractor assumes, in
the absence of limiting or exculpating contractual
provisions, liability for design deficiencies.' Id. at
36; see also Mobile Housing Environments v.
Barton and Barton, 432 F. Supp. 1343, 1347 (D.
Colo. 1977). As a result, 'most substantial designbuild firms attempt to negotiate contractual limits
on their liability." Bynum, at 36. This is frequently
accomplished through clauses excluding liability
for consequential damages or by carrying, at the
owners' expense, broad form builders' risk policies. Id.
Since design-build contracts are creatures of
general contract law, the allocation and scope of
the rights, duties, and responsibilities under the
contract must be determined by reference to the
terms of the contract and agreement between the
parties. As the trial court indicated, the perceptions and understandings of the parties may vary
from project to project. The importance of the
contractual arrangement is explained by an analogous discussion of architect liability:
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Now that architectural relationship!
take so many forms, a u much more
appropriate to allocate risks on the
basis of the parties* contracts as
modified by their later conduct.
.. Even if the suit u brought in tort,
the result will be the same since contract interpretation ts infected with the
ton standard of reasonable care, and
the existence of a ton duty u controlled by the contractual undertakings.
... Few duties can reasonably be
imposed in all contexts because the
architect's construction responsibilities
now vary greatly In general, the frequency of departures from the traditional model makes it appropriate to
regard the problem as one of contract
interpretation and thus to look to the
parlies' reasonable expectations.
Note, Architectural
Malpractice
A ContractBased Approach, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1075, 1083-90
(1979) (footnotes omitted)
Since the transition from the traditional allocation of responsibility to the design-build model is
likely to result in a wide variety of understandings
between parties, the particular agreement between
the parties is best defined by the terms of the
agreement within the context of the arrangement
worked out by the various parties
IV. BREACH OF W A R R A N T Y
A design flaw caused the damages in this case.
That is conceded The principal issue in this
lawsuit is whether the subcontractor^ Allen Steel,
was liable for the basic design of the project under
the terms of us design-build contract with
Okland-Foulger, notwithstanding a disclaimer of
us liability, or whether Okland-Foulger was
liable. The trial court held that the joint venture
agreement between Okland-Foulger and Allen
Steel obligated Okland-Foulger to design the
project and placed 'responsibility* for the design
on Okland-Foulger.
The trial court concluded as a matter of law that
*[t]he contract between Allen Steel and OklandFoulger is the proposal of January 11, 1978 as
orally modified The only modifications included
provisions as to time, selection of alternative two
[a composite metal deck], and a reduction in
price * Okland-Foulger asserts that the trial court
erred in that ruling and in not ruling that a proposed subcontract agreement dated September 5,
1978, embodied the contract.
The trial court's findings of fact on that point
are based on substantial evidence and are not
clearly erroneous under Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Okland-Foulger first contends that it did not
accept Allen Steel's January 11, 1978 proposal. A
binding contract exists only when there has been
mutual assent by the parties to be bound by the
terms of their agreement Bunncl v. Bills* 13 Utah
2d 83, 368 P 2d 597 (1962). The trial court,
however, specifically found that Okland-Foulger
did assent:

A; a meeting held in early March of
1978, the January II proposal was
a c c e p t e d by O k l a n d - F o u l g e r
Company with certain modifications,
although the document was never
signed and was not intended by the
parties as an integration. The composite metal deck alternative was selected
and the unit price was modified Some
provisions regarding time were also
modified.
.. On March 3, 1978, OklandFoulger sent a letter (letter of intent,
Exhibit 42) to Allen Steel indicating its
intent to enter into an agreement for
Allen Steel to provide the structural
steel for the project 'in accordance
with your (Allen Steel's) proposal "
This refers to the January 11, 1978
proposal.
The evidence clearly supports the findings. Mr.
Hendnk Van Rensburg, executive vice-president
of Allen Steel, testified that at the March 1
meeting, Alien Steel regarded the January proposal
as valid Likewise, Okland-Foulger's March 3,
1978 letter clearly suggests that Okland-Foulger
considered the proposal a valid agreement The
letter reads as follows.
This letter is to inform you of our
intent, upon the closing of the construction loan for Crossroads Plaza, to
enter into an agreement with Allen
Steel Company, to provide the structural steel and metal deck for said
project, in accordance with your proposal.
We understand, in turn, that Allen
Steel will make tentative agreements
with their suppliers at this time, to
insure that the above mentioned proposal will be maintained.
(Emphasis added.)
Okland-Foulger asserts that it did not agree to
the language of the January 11 proposal that the
owners* engineer was "to check this design and
make changes if necessary to enable him to accept
overall responsibility for the design * There is,
however, substantial evidence which supports the
trial court's conclusion that both parties knew of
and accepted those terms in the January 11 propositi Allen Steel clearly intended those terms to be
part of the agreement, and did so from the beginning, in an October, 1977 meeting, Robert Allen,
president of Allen Steel, William Howe of AllenHowe Specialties Corporation, and Hcndrik Van
Rensburg discussed Allen Steel's initial proposal
for the Crossroads project. William Howe's notes
of the meeting record the decision that Allen Steel
should bid Joseph Patrick's design but that the
owner, and not Allen Steel, must take responsibility for the design Mr Howe's handwritten notes
state:
10/31 fll
Crossroads Plaza
RBA [Robert Alien!
Van [Hendnk Van Rensburg]
ok to Bid struct pnee erected - to a
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design suggested by JT* f Joe Patrick)
Don't want resp. for design.
Owner must hire engineer A take
resp.
for design & review ours
Money in our bid to pay Joe for
prelim, design.
1. Owners Engr to check design & take
resp....
2. [Alternative of hiring engineer
crossed out.J if object - owner
issues sep contr to Joe
Accordingly, the November 1, 1977 proposal
stated:
The following design parameters have
been used for the structural design
suggested by our engineers to compute
the price. Owner's engineer is to check
this design and make changes if necessary to enable him to accept overall
responsibility for design. Changes that
affect quantity, weight, or complexity
of strucrural members will require an
adjustment in price.
Okland-Foulger contends that during a meeting
attended by Mr. Van Rensburg and George Marquardt of Allen Steel, Bill Howe, and either or
both Jack and Randy OkJand, Sid Foulger told
Allen Steel that this language in the November 1
proposal was unacceptable. The trial court found
otherwise, based on contrary evidence. Mr. Marquardt, Mr. Howe, Mr. Vac Rensburg, and Jack
and Randy Okland all testified that Mr. Foulger of
Okland-Foulger did not object to that language.
George Marquardt testified that no one told him
that the January 11 proposal language was unacceptable. Mr. Van Rensburg and Mr. Howe also
testified that no objection was raised to the proposal language in the November 1 proposal or the
January 11 proposal at any time. Jack Okland
testified that he had not seen the November 1
proposal prior to his 1982 deposition and that he
did not attend any meeting with Bill Howe. Randy
Okland testified that he did not bear anyone
object to Allen Steel's proposal language.
Allen Steel's November proposal was not accepted, and Allen Steel submitted a new proposal,
the January 11 proposal, which provided two
additional structural alternatives and included the
same disclaimer of design responsibility. OklandFoulger accepted the latter proposal by its March 3
letter. Although Okland-Foulger asserts that it
rejected the November proposal because of the
disclaimer, the trial court apparently believed the
testimony of Mr. Van Rensburg that OklandFoulger rejected the November proposal because it
wanted alternatives to the hambro joint structural
system, not because of any objection to the disclaimer.
Okland-Foulger also asserts that the language
of the January 11 agreement is of no effect
because it was superseded by the September 5
subcontract. The trial court found that Allen Steel
received the proposed agreement from OklandFoulger and that Robert Allen of Allen Steel
agreed to sign it after his attorney had reviewed it

1

and concluded it was not objectionable; but no
I one signed or accepted the September 5 proposed
1
subcontract. Okland-Foulger does not deny that
Allen Steel's attorney was to review that .subcontract or that no one signed it.
Acceptance of t contract 'requires manifestation
of unconditional agreement to all of the terms of
I the offer and an intention to be bound thereby....
[ItJ must be clear, positive and unambiguous.' RJ.
Daum Constr. Co. v. Child. 122 Utah 194,
j 200, 247 P.2d 817, 819-20 (1952) (citations
omitted). Allen Steel's promise to review the
document and to sign it was not an acceptance and
did not obligate Allen Sted to sign the document
if the proposed agreement were unsatisfactory.
Even if the parties intended to integrate or formalize the January U proposal in a subcontract
agreement, '{tjae fact that part of the perform:
ance is that the parties will enter into a contract in
the future does not render the original agreement
any less binding.' Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83,
87, 368 P.2d 597, 600 (1962) (footnote omitted).
Allen Stee! could, and did, refuse to sign an agreement that it did not believe properly formalized
the agreement already reached. Moreover, Alien
Steel's actions did aot indicate an acceptance of
the proposed subcontract. Allen Stee! continued to
perform the existing January 11 contract under
which it had been performing for months.
In sum, the facts amply support the court's
findings and legal conclusion that OklandFoulger accepted Allen Steel's January II proposal and that the later September proposal did not
bind the parties because it was not accepted by
Allen Steel.
The January II proposal was offered for the
'design, fabrication, and erection of the Structural
Elements only for the Tower and Mall* <emphasis
mdded). The proposal also provided that the
"following design parameters have been used for
the structural design suggested by our {i.e., Allen
Steel'sJ engineers to compute the price. Owner's
engineer is to check this design and make changes
if necessary to enable him to accept overall responsibility for design' (emphasis added). That
'overall responsibility' included compliance with
the Uniform Building Code.
The trial court also found as a matter of fact
that Okland-Foulger provided Allen Steel with
general design parameters and that OklandFoulger relied upon Allen Steel to provide the
design of the structure. In addition, the trial court
found that Allen Steel knew that the structural
aspects of the project were 'to be constructed in
conformity with the Uniform Building Code (1976
Edition), and standards appropriate in Seismic
Zone HI.'
The trial court ruled, however, as a matter of
law, that the contract language negated any liability on the pan of Allen Steel to Okland-Foulger
for a design defect. In effect, Allen Steel promised
to provide a 'working' design which it would use
for pricing purposes only, and Okland-Foulger
was obligated to ensure that the desijgp was sufficient and that it would comply with code and
safety requirements.
These conclusions require us to decide whether a
party to a contract may agree to provide a design
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for a construction project which is to conform to
the Uniform Building Code and in the same contract preclude liability to the other party for
breach of warranty for failure to conform by a
contract term that the other party to the contract
is to accept overall responsibility for the design.
i
A . Express W&rrunty
As defined by 17A C.J.S. Contracts §342, at 325
(1963), a warranty "is an assurance by one party
to a contract of the existence of a fact upon which
the other party may rely. It is intended to relieve
the promisee of any duty to ascertain the fact for
himself ....* (Footnotes omitted.) No specific
language is required to create a warranty. For one
parry to be held to a warranty in a contract, the
natural tendency of the statement must be to
induce a party to enter into the transaction. Welchman v. Wood, 10 Utah 2d 325, 329, 353 P.2d
165, 168 (1960). "Express warranties are construed
according to the clear and natural import of the
language used ...." 17A C.J.S. Contracts §342, at
327.
Although the January 11 contract contains specific reference to the Uniform Building Code, it
does not contain a specific or express covenant
that the structural design will conform to the
Code. To the contrary, the contract states precisely
the reason for the reference to the Building Code;
and the reason, in the context of a design-build
contract, makes eminent good sense, i.e., that the
Code is one of the 'design parameters' used by
Allen SteelV engineers "to compute the price.*
Such language does not create an express warranty
that the design will conform to the Code.
B. Implied
Warranty
As a general rule, courts -do not imply a warranty
unless there is a representation relied upon which
is the basis for the bargain. See, -e.g., Atlas
Constr. Co. v. Aqua Drilling Co., 559 P.2d 39
^Wyo. 1977). Nevertheless, an implied warranty
may exist because of the conduct of the parties. Moore
v. James, 5 Utah 2d 91, 297 P.2d 221
(1956). Beyond that, this Court has recognized in
the context of construing a building contract, that
"(ilnsofar as a municipal ordinance is applicable to
a contract, it is by operation of law an implied
term of that contract.* Quagliana v. Exquisite
Howe Builders, Inc., 538 P.2d 301,, 308 (Utah
1975); see also St. Joseph Hosp. v. Corbetta
Constr. Co., 21 111. App. 3d 925, 316 N.E.2d 51
(1974); Bon v. Moser, 175 Va. 11, 7 S.E.2d 217
(1940); Bebb v. Jordan, 111 Wash. 73, 189 P. 553
(1920).
Thus, a warranty that the design of a building
will conform to the building code is generally
implied by operation of law in a contract to design
a building. The rationale for the rule is that an
architect or other design professional is 'bound to
know the building restrictions of the designated
place, and draw the plans and specifications accordingly.* Bon, 175 Va. at 15, 7 S.E.2d at 218.
Nevertheless, a warranty will not be implied where
the contract expressly negates or disclaims such a
warranty. Fredrickson £ Watson Constr. Co. v.
Department of Public Works, 28 Cal. App. 3d
514, 104 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1972). Parties should be
allowed to make any bargain they wish, including
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one excluding any warranty. See AES Technology
Sys., Inc. v. Coherent Radiation. 583 F.2d 933
(7th Cir. 1978); cf. United States v. Bethlehem
Steel Co., 205 U.S. 105 (1907). It is not the role of
the courts to rewrite contracts between parties
possessing equaJ bargaining power. See Universal
Drilling Co. v. Camay Drilling Co., 737 F.2d 869.
874 (10th Cir. 1984).
There is no contention that the parties possessed
such disparate bargaining power that the agreement was unfairly coerced. Okland-Foulger had
the clear-cut duty' under the plain language of the
January II agreement to check the structural
design submitted by Allen Stee! and to assume
overall responsibility' for it. The trial court correctly concluded that this language imposed responsibility on Okland-Foulger for the adequacy of
the design and negated Allen Steel's liability, at
least as between the parties, for that design. To
conclude otherwise would nullify the express language of the agreement* between the parties. This
conclusion is also supported by ample parol evidence adduced at trial. In all events, the trial court
did not commit clear error in reaching the conclusion it did.
Contractual disclaimers may, however, be disallowed if they conflict with 'some consideration of
public policy.' Walker Bank £ Trust Co. v. First
Security Corp., 9 Utah 215, 220, 341 P.2d 944,
947 (1959). Okland-Foulger argues that if we
construe the language of the January 11 proposal
to preclude Allen Steel's liability for breach of
warranty, such a <iisclaimer violates the public
policy of this state against disclaimers of liability
for negligence in the performance of construction.
Utah Code Ann. §13-8-1 (1986) prohibits
agreements in construction contracts to indemnify
the indemnitee 'against liability for damages
arising out of bodily injury to persons or damage
to property caused by or resulting from the sole
negligence of the [indemnitee]. *
Section 13-8-1 does not apply here. In the
first place, the January 11 agreement does not
provide for indemnification at all. Furthermore,
the statute prohibits indemnification for tort liability' resulting from consequential damages for
bodily injury or damage to property. The provision does not include contract damages for rectifying a failure to meet specifications.
In sum, the contract language that the owner's
engineer was to check the design 'to enable him to
accept overall responsibility for design* negated
the existence of a warranty by Allen Steel.
V. C O N T R A C T O R S BOND S T A T U T E
Equitable and Crossroads argue that although the
trial court may have correctly niled that OklandFoulger was personally liable under the January 11
agreement for the remaining payment due to Allen
Steel, Equitable and Crossroads are not personally
liable to Allen Stee! because they were not parties
to the agreement between Allen Steel and OklandFoulger. We affirm the trial court's conclusion
and bold that Crossroads and Equitable, as
lessees, are personally liable to Allen Steel based
on their failure to furnish a contractor's bond for
the project in compliance with Utah Code Ann.
§14-2-2(1973).
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The contractor's bond statute in effect a: the Crossroads joint venture agreement between
time of the relevant events required the owner of tfkland-Foulger and Equitable provided that
improved property to obtain a bond tc guarantee 1 Okiand-Foulger, in its individual capacity, would
payment of subcontractors and materialmen if the act as the general contractor overseeing the improvements. But the joint venture itself, Crossroads,
genera] contractor fails to pay them*
had the duty to obtain a bond from the general
The owner of an> interest ic land entcontractor, Okiand-Foulger, to ensure payment
ering into a contract, involving $2,000
of materialmen and subcontractors such as Allen
or more, for the construction addition
Steel. We therefore conclude that Equitable,
to. or alteration or repair of, any buiOkland-Foulger, and Crossroads are personally
lding, structure or improvement upon
liable tc Allen Steel under the contractor's bond
land shall, before an> such work is
statute because of their failure to procure a contcommenced, obtain from the contraractor's bond.
ctor a bond in a sum equal to the
On the other hand, the landowners/lessors are
contract price, -with food and sufficient
aot liable under the contractor's bond statute
sureties, conditioned for the faithful
because they did not enter "into a contract ... for
performance of the contract and
the construction ... or improvement upon land."
prompt payment for materia] furnished
Utah Code Ann. §14-2-1 (Supp. 1977). Furtand labor performed under the conthermore, because of the common purpose of the
ract. Such bond shall run to the owner
mechanic's lien statutes (§§38-1-1 to 38-1and to al! other persons as their inte2£) and contractor's bond statutes (§§14-2-1
rest ma> appear; and an> person who
and 14-2-2) and their practically identical lanhas furnished materials or performed
guage, adjudications as to what is lienable under
labor for or upon any such building,
the former are helpful in determining the proper
structure or improvement, payment for
application of the latter. King Bros. v. Utah Dry
which has not been made, shall have a
Kiln Co.. 21 Utah 2d at 46, 440 P.2d at 19. In
direct right of action against the surelight of our discussion infra affirming the trial
ties upon such bond for the reasonable
court's finding that the landowners/lessors are
value of the materials furnished or
not liable under the mechanic's lien statute, that is
labor performed, not exceeding,
an additional reason wh> the landowners/lessors
however, in any case the prices agreed
are not liable under the contractor's bond statute.
upon; which right of action shall
accrue forty days after the completion,
VI. NEGLIGENCE
or abandonment, or default in the
The trial court concluded that "Allen Steel is not
performance, of the work provided for
liable in tort to Okland-Foulger for (Joseph
in the contract.
Patrick's] negligence.* First, defendants assert
"Hie bond herein provided So: shall
that Allen Steel is liable ic negligence for the defbe exhibited to any person interested,
ective design of the tower. They state ihat the
upon request.
design failed to conform with the Uniform BuilUtah Code Ann. §14-2-1 (Supp. 1977). If a ding Code. It is well established that to base an
bond is noi obtained, the "owner" is personally action in tort, there must be a breach of duty
liable to all materialmen and subcontractors who apart from the nonperformance of a contract. Aspell
have cot been paid. That liability was established
v. American Contract Bridge League, 122
bere by Utah Code Ann. §14-2-2 (1973):
Aril. 399, 595 P.2d 191 <Ct. App. 1979); Steiner
Corp. v. American Dist. Tel., 106 Idaho 787, 6&3
Any person subject to the provisions
P,2d
435 <1984). Since the January (1 agreement
of this chapter, who shall fail to obtain
allocated legal responsibilir> for the design of the
such good and •sufficient bond, or to
structure to Okland-Foulger* rather than Allen
exhibit the same, as herein required,
Steel, Allen Steel had no contractual duty as to the
shall be personally liable to all persons
adequacy of the design vis-a-vis Oklandwho have furnished materials or perfFcmlger.
ormed labor under the contract for the
Neither did Allen Steel violate a statutory duty.
reasonable value of such materials
The existence of a municipal ordinance such as the
furnished or labor performed, not
building code does not alter our conclusion. Even
exceeding, however, in any case the
if Allen Steel were liable under such an ordinance
prices agreed upon. Actions to recover
to third persons for an unsafe or dangerous designon such liability shall be commenced
-afi issue as to which we express no opinionwithin one year from the last date the
defendants are not -within the class of people the
last materials were furnished or the
statute was intended to protect. See Union Pac.
labor performed.
Ry. v. McDonald, 152 U.S. 262,283 (1894).
(Emphasis added.)
Defendants also contend that Allen Steel is
The owners of a leasehold, or tenants under a
liable
under the principle of respondeat superior
lease, are 'owners* of an interest in land under
§14-2-1 and §14-2-2. King Bros. v. Utah for the negligence of Joseph Patrick in preparing
Dry Kiln Co., 21 Utah 2d 43, 440 P.2d 17 (1968); the design. However, the trial court concluded that
Patrick was an independent contractor, and that
Metals Mfg. Co. \. Bank of Commerce, 16 Utah
2d 74, 395 P.2d 914 (1964); Buehner Block Co. v. conclusion is ampl> supported by substantial eviCiezos, 6 Utah 2d 226, 310 P.2d 517 (1957). The dence.
Patrick testified that the onl> agreement between
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

a preliminary design for S25,00C. He also testified
that Allen Stee! did not hire him to be the engineer
of record or to prepare a complete structural
design. Nor did Allen Steel request specifically that
he design the shear wall. Although Allen Steel
referred in one letter tc Joseph Patrick as *pur
ftrucrura.' engineer/ the coun found that* throughout the summer of 197E, Patrick communicated
directly with both Allen Stee! and OklafldFoulger. Okland-Foulger dealt directly with
Patrick regarding such details as concrete te$ts,
elevator area design, and tenant improvements.
Patrick performed many functions at the request
of Allen Steel, many at the request of OklandFoulger, and some at the request of both; nevertheless, his manner of performing the work, the
hours, and places of work were determined by bim
aione. Under lhese circumstances, the trial court
appropriately found Patrick to be an independent
contractor.
Under principles of vicarious liability, an employer is not responsible for the negligence of an
independent contractor. Cleason v. Sair Lake City*
94 Utah 1, 74 P.2d 1225 (1937). Although an
exception to this rule exists where an employer
contractually undertakes control or responsibility
for a task performed by an independent contra%
ctor, id., Allen Stee! assumed no such obligation.
Therefore, the trial coun correctly ruled that Allen
Stee! was not liable in tort to Okland-Foulger.2
VII. L A N D O W N E R S ' LIABILITY
Allen Steel challenges the trial court's conclusion
that 'Allen Steel's [mechanic's] ben is not valid *$
against the landowner defendants because they
were not parties to any contract with Allen Steel.*
In particular, Allen Steel challenges the conclusion
that there is no evidence that the landowners
would benefit from the construction of the Crossroads project at the end of the leases.
Interiors Contracting Inc. v. NavaJco, 548 P,2d
1382, 1386 (Utah 1982), held that 'the mere existence of a lessor-lessee relationship, without
more, does not justify charging the lessor's interest with a mechanic's lien for improvements
made on the property at the instance of (he
lessee.' There are, however, occasions when a
lessor's interest may be subject to a mechanic's
lien. First, a lessor's property interest may be
subject to a lien if an agreement, express or
implied, exists between the lessor or his agent and
the contractor. Zions First Nat'J Bank v. Carlson,
23 Utah 2d 395, 464 P.2d 387 (1970). The trial
coun concluded that there was no agreement
between Allen Stee! and the landowners regarding
the construction of Crossroads Tower. Nor is there
any indication or evidence that Crossroads or
Equitable were agents of the landowners.
A second basis tor imposing a mechanic* s lien
on the fee interest of a landowner may exist if the
contract between the landowner and the lessee
requires the lessee to construct improvements that
enhance the value of the freehold. See Interiors
Contracting, 648 P.2d at 1388. Even though the
landowners' leases with Crossroads may have
required the Crossroads project to be constructed,
that is not necessarily determinative of whether the

AAUUUWUCI* interests are suDjecx to tne lien. See Gorman i. Birrel!, 41 Utah 274, 125 P. 685 (1912;;
Morrow v. Mem'rt, 16 Utah 412, 52 P. 667 (1898;
The lav is that *a lessor is subject to a lien for
improvements by a tenant if the lease 'requires or
obligates the tenant to construct improvements which
substantially enhance the value of the fretbold . . . " Interiors Contracting, 648 P.2d at I 3 r
(citing Utley *. Wear, 333 S.W.2d 787 (Mo. a .
App. I960) (emphasis in original).
Thus, for a lien to exist against the lessor's
interest, the value of the lessor's interest must be
substantially enhanced. Ordinarily, improvements
will enhance the value of an interest in land only if
the value of the improvements extend beyond the
life of the lease. The landowners' leases with
Crossroads have a primary term of 62 years and
three ! 0-year renewal option periods-a total
potential lease term of 92 years.
Allen Steel presented no evidence of the useful
life of the improvements or their value in either 62
years or 92 years. The trial coun concluded, as a
matter of fact:
There is no evidence that the useful life
of the improvements extends beyond
the lease period or that the landowners
will benefit from the construction of
the Crossroads Project.
It follows, as the trial court held, that there is
no lien against the landowners' fee estate.
V m . DEFICIENCY J U D G M E N T A N D
ATTORNEY FEES
Aii«> Steel alsfc c*oss~fc^?etJs> tht portion of \ht
judgment in its favor against Okland-Foulger
which limited liability for any deficiency judgment
after foreclosure of the mechanic's lien to OklandFoulger. Allen Steel contends that Crossroads and
Equitable should also be held liable for a deficiency judgment.3 The developers, Crossroads and
Equitable, claim that if they are subject to the
mechanic's lien law, their financial exposure to
Allen Steel is limited to their interest in the lien
property under Utah Code Ann. §38-1-16
(1988). They argue that they are not personally
liable to plaintiff under the mechanic's hen law
because they were not parties to the contract
between Allen Steel and Okland-Foulger. There
is, therefore, no basis for holding tnem personally
liable for attorney fees under the mechanic's lien
law.
Utah Code Ann. §38-1-18 (1988) governs the
assessment of attorney fees in a mechanic's lien
action and remains unchanged since the events
underlying this lawsuit:
In any action brought to enforce any
lien under this chapter the successful
party shall be entitled to recover a
Tt2*on*b\t aftorntyV St*, u> t * fixto,
by the coun, which shall be taxed as
costs in the action.
Equitable and Crossroads concede that even if
Allen Steel is entitled to attorney fees from funds
derived from the mechanic's lien foreclosure sale
under §38-1-18, they arc not personally liable
for Allen Steel's attorney fees resulting from the
lien foreclosure action. They contend that §38-1-
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If should be read to be consistent with §38-1- j 2 The same conclusion applies to the ton countef16 (1988). which reads:
j claims of defendants Equitable and Crossroads.
Allen Stee! owed them no contractual or statutory
Ever} person whose claim is not satisdut) beyond what was owed to Okland-Foulger.
fied as herein provided ma> have jud| Furthermore, since the trial court ruled that Joseph
gment docketed for the balance
II Patrick was an independent contractor for whose
unpaid, and execution therefor against
j negligence Allen Stee! was not liable to Oklandthe parry personally ha We.
I Foulger, *e perceive no basis for holding Allen Steel
Attorne> fees become pan of the taxable costs in a liable in tort to Equitable or Crossroads. If anytlien foreclosure action pursuant to §38-1-18. hing, Equitable and Crossroads may have a cause of
Section 38-1-16 limits a deficiency judgment, action against Patrick.
which would include attorney fees, to a "parry 3 Paragraph seven of the trial court's order of
personal!) liable." That term means the person or iI February 13, 1985, gives rise to this appeal. It propart) that entered into the contraa which gave rise vides: "In the event a deficiency may remain in
to the furnishing of labor and supplies to improve » satisfaction of Allen Steel's judgment, costs, and
any attorney's fees it ma) then have been awarded
the reaJ property and is personally liable therefor.
In sum, we affirm the award of attorney fees. after applying all tht proceeds of the foreclosure
sale, Allen Steel is awarded a deficiency judgment
We also affirm the trial court's award of a defic- against Okland-Foulger." The names of
ient judgment for attorney fees against- Okland- "Crossroads Plaza Associates" and "Equitable" are
Foulger.
j lined through, implying that there ma) be no deficiency judgment against Crossroads or Equitable for
IX. DELAY COSTS
the judgment, costs, or attorney fees under the
Allen Steel next argues that it is entitled to a new mechanic's lien statute.
trial on the issue of dela> damages. Since OklandFoulger agreed to "accept overall responsibility for
design" and the trial court found that Allen Steel ZIMMERMAN, Justice: (Concurring and
had breached no contractual obligation, Alien Dissenting)
I concur in the opinion of Justice Stewart,
Steel argues, it was improper to deny plaintiff
delay damages for defendants' fault in delaying | except for that portion which upholds the trial
court's conclusion that the contraa between the
completion of the contraa. We disagree.
Simpl) because Okland-Foulger accepted parties constituted an express disclaimer of any
overall responsibility for design and because Allen warranty b) Allen Steel that the design met the
Steel did not breach its obligation, do not necess- j requirements of the Uniform BuDding Code. In
aril) mean that OkJand-Foulger's conduct was I my view, Allen Steel undertook to satisfy the
the proximate, cause of Allen Steel's damages. requirements of the Code and breached that proParagraph 3 of the trial court's conclusions indi- vision of the contraa.
The trial court found that "the January 11,
cate an independent source of fault for delay:
1978,
proposal required Allen Steel Company to
Joseph Patrick was an independent
j
design the ,struauraJ dements* of the tower,"
contractor and Allen Steel is not liable
that the January 11th proposal was 'the contraa
in tort to Okland-Foulger for his
I
between Allen Steel" and defendants, that Allen
negligence, nor is Okland-Foulger
Steel knew that its design was to conform to the
liable in tort to Allen Steel for
requirements of the Uniform BuDding Code, that
Patrick's negligence.
the struauraJ design provided by Allen Steel purNor does plaintiff convince us with its sparse
suant to the proposal '(did] not comp!) with the
review on this point that there are 'volumes of
Uniform Building Code," and that Oklandevidence supporting the decision in favor of Allen
Foulger and Equitable breached no duty of care in
Steel." Plaintiff does not cite any significant
their review of the defective design. Yet in the face
portion of the record to sho» that the trial court's
of this prima facie finding of a breach of contraa
findings *ere dearl> erroneous. It does not follow
by Allen Steel, the trial court concluded as a
that the trial court's ruling that Allen Steel is not
matter of la* that the following language from the
entitled to delay damages was clearl) erroneous
January 11th proposal "excluded any warranty for
because the trial court made the finding that the j
the design."
evidence "is insufficient to prove that OklandThis proposal is offered for the design,
Foulger [and] Equitable ... breached a duty of care
fabrication,
and erection of the structo adequately review the design."
tural elements onl) for the Tower and
Affirmed.
Mall. T^ie following design parameters
have been used for the structural
WE CONCUR:
design suggested by our engineers to
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice
compute the price. Owner's engineer is
Richard C. Howe, Associate Chief Justice
to check this design,and make changes
Christine M. Durham, Justice
if necessary to enable him to accept
overall responsibility
for design.
1. We make no ultimate determination of responsiChanges that effect [sic] quality,
bilit) between Okland-Foulger and the engineer,
weight, or complexity of structural
Joseph Patrick, or anyone else. Our holding, of
members will require an adjustment in
course, does not extend beyond the facts of this
price.
case.
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(Emphasis added) In m> view this language The parties have failed tc make clear the exac
cannot accompbsfc the end claimed for it cy the procedural course of the case IE the tna) court
Nevertheless we bebeve that the case is subject to
tnal court
I agree with Jusuce Sir*an that parties to a [ ar appropriate decision and proceed oc the basis
construction contract car disclaim liability for a ' of the case as presented in the bnefs
The United States Nivy contracted in late 1978
design's failure to comph with applicable building
codes However, J am of th: v>r» that to disclaim with the <Jefendant, Tnax tc renovate certain
r
such a warrant), which Justice Stewart concedes is military housing oc the island o Midway The
Navy
contrac*
included
provisions
tha> Tnax was
impbed in all contracts to provide designs for
buildings and which I conclude the trial judge to provide all the materials and equipment necesr
found was an express part of the agreement sary for the work tha* the manner o delivery of
between the parties here, the language used must materials and equipment to the island was the
be clear and unambiguous Vague generalities choice of Tnax and that the term of the contract
about 'responsibility* for the design in a bidding »as 560 days Ic January of 1979, Tnax submitted
document will oot suffice to disclaim a responsi- to the Navy a progress schedule which was apprbility so fundamentally linked xo the furnishing of oved .February 10, 1979, calling for the work to be
completed within a five-month penod
a detailed design See, e g , United States v
Spcann, 248 U.S 132, 137 (1918), KeUey > Bank
Tnax subcontracted the labor for the job
BJdg and Equip Corp of America, 453 F.2d 774, During late 1978 and early 1979 Tnax negotiated
777 (J Oth Or 1972), Jack B Parson Constr Co
with the plaintiff, Co-Ax, to provide the labor
v Utah Dep*t of Transp , 725 P 2d 614, 616-17 force for all but the plumbing work for the
(Utah 1986), Thorn Constr Co v Utah Dcp'i of
project The contract pnee between Tnax and CoTransp . 598 P 2d 365, 3^-68 (Utah 1*79)
Ax was determined b> a calculation of the cost of
Because I conclude that the tnal court «rred in labor plus an agreed profu p c month for a penod
concluding that the above language operated as a of five months On January 11, 1979, Co-Ax and
disclaimer, I would reverse the portion of the Tnax signed a forma] contract The contract,
judgment that found against defendants on their however, -was silent as to the -supply and delivery
r
counterclaim against Allen Steel and remand the o matenals and equipmen* and the length of time
for
which the labor force was to be supplied by Cocase for further proceedings
Ax
The laborers supplied by Co-Ax amved on the
island in the first pan of February At the end of
five months, the renovation of the buildings had
Cue as
not been completed and the work had come to a
119 Utah Adv. Rep. 17
standstill because of shortages of matenals due to
delays in the delivery of matenals and equipment
The materia! shortages were caused by shipping
problems Tnax had selected the Military Sea
Transpon Service as the shipping agent During
CO-AX ENTERPRISES CORP., a Utah
this penod, Co-Ax received payments from Tnax
corporation,
on the contract, for the labor performed but
Plaintiff and Appellant,
nothing for the profit which had been agreed
v.
upon
The TRIAX C O . , a Utah corporation,
Co-Ax's request for additional funds to
Defendant and Appellee.
remain on the island for a longer term was refused
by Tnax, and Co-Ax's construction crew abanN o . 20033
doned the project The job was completed by a
FILED. October 1 1 , 1 9 8 9
new work crew employed by Tnax Subsequently,
Co-Ax, as the labor subcontractor, sued Tnax,
Fourth District, Utah County
contending that the parties had agreed that CoHonorable George E Ballif
Ax would provide the labor source for a fivemonth .penod and that Tnax had promised to
ATTORNEYS:
supply matenals and equipment Co-Ax conteClaron C Spencer, Dale E Anderson, Salt
nded that the inability to complete its work was
Lake City, for appellant
the result o f shortages of matenals and equipment
due to delays in delivery which were the responsiWilliam L Nixon, Alpine, Denver C Snuffer,
bilry of Tnax Co-Ax sought <iamages for lost
Salt Lake City, for appellee
profits and compensation for tools which had been
left behind
This opinion is subject to revision before
Tnax denied that it had agreed to provide matpublication in the Pacific Reporter.
enals and equipment to meet Co-Ax schedules
and denied that the subcontract was to be complSTEWART, Justice:
Co-Ax Enterprises ('Co-Ax') appeals from a eted within the five-month penod Tnax contejudgment of the trial court which held that Co- nded that the January 11, 1979 wnting was the
Ax failed to prove its breach of contract claim entire agreement between the parties Tnax counterclaimed against Co-Ax, seeking damages for
brought against The Tnax Company (*Tnax")
the additional employees which it had to hire to
complete the project
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conspicuous gap in the workmen's compen- effects that Congress did not intend to
sation field by furnishing protection sanction when it enacted § 290. These efagainst death or disability to laborers and fects are clearly impermissible under the
mechanics employed by contractors or oth- rationale that the Senate articulated for
er persons on Federal property." S.Rep. removing from the bill the two obnoxious
No. 2294, at 1.
provisions that had been included in the
That Congress intended nothing more House version. And even if I were to
than to provide much-needed coverage to conclude that Congress had acted ambiguthese workers is shown by the single re- ously on this score, I would at least be
vealing item in the scanty legislative histo- forced to conclude that Congress offered
ry of the statute. The House version of no "clear" or "unambiguous" mandate for
the bill not only would have extended cov- the kind of specific regulatory compulsion
erage to these workers, but also would that this Ohio law exerts upon this federal
have subjected federal property to state facility.
safety and insurance regulations and would
I therefore respectfully dissent.
have authorized state officers to enter
upon federal premises in furtherance of
| KEY NUMBER SYSTEM
these aims. The Senate struck out these
latter provisions at the request of the Executive Branch of the Federal Government,
noting expressly that they "would not only
produce conflicts of authority between
State and Federal officers but would also
486 U.S. 196, 100 L.Ed.2d 178
mark a wide departure from the well-estabj I96 Joseph G. BUDINICH, Petitioner,
lished principle that Federal officers should
have complete charge of any regulations
v.
pertaining to Federal property." S.Rep. BECTON DICKINSON AND COMPANY,
No. 2294, at 2. As no such departure from
Respondent.
normal practice was intended by Congress,
No. 87-283.
the Senate version of the bill was enacted.

£

This background to the enactment of
§ 290 shows that Congress did not intend
to expose federal instrumentalities to the
kind of detailed and mandatory regulation
that is provided by the Ohio law at issue in
this case. The Court's response on this
point is simply to assert that "[t]he effects
of direct regulation on the operation of
federal projects are significantly |195more
intrusive than the incidental regulatory effects of such an additional award provision." Ante, at 1712. In some instances
the Court may be correct that the effects
of direct regulation could be more intrusive
than a provision for penalty awards, but
the question here is not whether these two
things are exactly the same, but simply
whether the "regulatory effects" of the
penalty provision, which as set out above
are far from "incidental," are the kinds of

Argued March 21, 1988.
Decided May 23, 1988.
Former employee brought action
against former employer for breach of contract, quantum meruit, misrepresentation,
and outrageous conduct in connection with
reduction in commissions. The United
States District Court for the District of
Colorado, Sherman G. Finesilver, Chief
Judge, entered judgment on jury verdict
for less than amount sought, denied employee's new trial motions, and later rendered decision with regard to attorney fees.
Employee appealed. The Court of Appeals,
807 F.2d 155, dismissed, and employee petitioned for writ of certiorari. The Supreme
Court, Justice Scalia, held that district
court's decision on merits was "final deci-
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sion," from which appeal had to be timely
taken, even though employee's request for
attorney fees had not yet been decided
Affirmed

1. Federal Courts <s=>372
Although state law generally supplies
rules of decision in federal diversity cases,
it does not control resolution of issues governed by federal statute U S C A Const
Art 6, cl 2 28 U S C A § 1652
2. Federal Courts e=>433
In diversity case, any question as to
appealability of district court's decision as
final decision on merits is question of federal and not state law U S C A Const
Art 6, cl 2, 28 U S C A §§ 1291, 1652

g

a

3 Federal Courts <3=*433
Federal procedural statute mandating
when appeal might be taken from one federal court to another could properly be
applied in diversity case without violating
Tenth Amendment
U S C A Const
Amend 10, 28 U S C A § 1291
4. Federal Courts <s=>599
Order ending litigation on ments may
qualify as "final order" for purpose of appeal, though question still remains to be
decided, where resolution of question will
not alter order or moot or revise decisions
embodied in order 28 U S C A § 1291
See publication Worlds and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions
5. Federal Courts <S=>599
Decision on mencs is "final decision"
for purpose of appeal^ whether or not there
remains for adjudication a request for at
tomey fees attributable to case
28
USC A § 1291
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions
* The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion
of the Court but has been prepared by the Re
porter of Decisions for the convenience of the

4S6 US,

6. Federal Courts <s=>670
Court of Appeals was without jung<jy
tion to review case on ments, where notiS
of appeal was not timely fifoj*
FRAPRules 2, 3(a), 4(a)(1), 26(b) 28
USCA
Syllabus *
In petitioner's employment compensv
tion action, which respondent remove*
from a Colorado state court to the Federal
District Court on the basis of diversity of
citizenship, judgment was entered on thfc
jury's verdict for petitioner in an amomfc
considerably less than he had sought p$|
titioner timely filed new trial motions and ^
motion for attorney's fees under Colorado
law On May 14, 1984, the court denied th#
new trial motions but found that petition
was entitled to attorney's fees, and,
August 1, 1984, entered a final order dete*
mining the amount of the fees On Aug
29, petitioner filed notice of appeal to
Court of Appeals, covenng all of the Du
tnct Court's post-trial orders Although
affirming the attorney's fees award, tbi
court granted respondent's motion to diaJ
miss as to all other issues on the ground^
that the judgment was final and immediate*?
ly appealable upon entry of the May \A
order denying the new trial motions, an&
that the appeal notice was not filed withu^
30 days of that order as required by Federal
al Rules of Appellate Procedure 4(aXl) andi
(4)
Held
1* The question whether the District
Court's decision on the ments was appealable before the attorney's fees determination was made is governed by federal law—
specifically 28 U S C § 1291, which provides that all district court "final decisions"
are appealable to the courts of a p p e a r and not by Colorado law Although state
law generally supplies the rules of decision
in federal diversity cases, it does not control the resolution of issues governed by
federal statute The contention that the
reader See United States v Detroit Lumber Co,
200 US 321 337 26 S Ct 282 287 50 L Ed
499

486 U.S. 198

BUDINICH v. BECTON DICKINSON AND CO.
Cite a* 108 S.Ct. 1717 (1988)

application of § 1291 to diversity cases
would violate the Tenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution is without merit, since
§ 1291 is "rationally capable of classification" as a procedural rule, and is therefore
necessary and proper for implementing
Congress' Art. Ill, § 1, power to establish
federal courts. Kanna v. Plumer, 380
U.S. 460, 472, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 1144, 14
L.Ed.2d 8. Pp. 1719-1720.
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Justice SCALIA delivered the opinion of
the Court.
Petitioner brought this action in Colorado
state court to recover employment compensation allegedly due. Respondent removed
the case to the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado on the basis of
diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332,
1441. A jury awarded petitioner a verdict
of $5,000 (considerably less than had been
2. A decision on the merits is a "final sought), and judgment was entered on
decision" for purposes of § 1291, and is March 26, 1984. Petitioner timely filed
therefore immediately appealable, even new-trial motions, challenging various rulthough the recoverability or amount of at- ings by the District Court, and a motion for
torney's fees for the litigation remains to attorney's fees. (Colorado law provides
be determined. The merits order ends the that in a suit to collect compensation due
litigation on the merits, and the remaining from employment "the judgment ... shall
fees question does not prevent finality, include a reasonable attorney fee in favor
since it is collateral to, and separate^? of the winning party, to be taxed as part of
from, the order, and resolution of it cannot the costs of the action." Colo.Rev.Stat 8alter or amend the order or moot any deci- 4-114 (1986).) On May 14, 1984, the Dissions that the order embodies. According trict Court denied the new-trial motions,
different treatment to attorney's fees when found that petitioner was entitled to attorthey are deemed part of the merits recov- ney's fees, and requested further briefing
ery by statutory or decisional law (as peti- and documentation before determining^
tioner claims is the case in Colorado) would their amount. The District Court issued its
not serve § 1291's purposes, and would dis- final order concerning the attorney's fees
serve the interests of courts and litigants on August 1, 1984. On August 29, petitionbecause, since the merits or nonmerits sta- er filed notice ef appeal to the Court of
tus of a fee provision is often unclear, the Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, covering all
issue of finality and hence the jurisdictional the District Court's post-trial orders.
time for appeal would be left in doubt.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the
The argument that the Court of Appeals' appeal, arguing that the judgment was fidecision constitutes a significant change in nal and \ immediately appealable when the
the law and therefore should be applied order denying the new-trial motions was
only prospectively cannot avail petitioner, entered May 14, 1984, and that the notice
since, regardless of whether such a change of appeal was not filed within 30 days of
has occurred, the untimely filed notice of that order as required by Federal Rules of
appeal did not give the. court jurisdiction to Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1) and (4). The
review the merits decision. Pp. 1720-1722. Court of Appeals granted the motion to
807 F.2d 155 (CA10 1986), affirmed. dismiss as to all issues except the award of
attorney's fees, which it affirmed. We
SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion for a
granted certiorari, 484 U.S. 895, 108 S.Ct.
unanimous Court
226, 98 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987), to resolve a
conflict in the Courts of Appeals. Compare, e.g., Holmes v. J. Ray McDermott &
Thomas Frank, Evergreen, Colo., for pe- Co., 682 F.2d 1143, 1146 (CA5 1982), cert,
titioner.
denied, 459 U.S. 1107, 103 S.Ct. 732, 74
Terre Lee Rushton, Denver, Colo., for L.Ed.2d 956 (1983), with, e.g., International Assn. of Bridge, Structural, Ornamenrespondent.
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tal, and Reinforcing Ironworkers' Local
Union 75 v. Madison Industries, Inc., 733
F.2d 656, 658 (CA9 1984).
It is common ground in this case that if
the District Court's decision on the merits
was appealable before its determination of
attorney's fees, then the merits appeal was
untimely. See Fed. Rules App.Proc. 4(aXl),
(4), (6); Fed. Rules Civ.Proc. 54(a), 58. Petitioner contends that Colorado law governs this question and that "[u]nder Colorado law a claim is not final and appealable
until attorneys fees are fully determined."
Brief for Petitioner 13. We do not agree
that Colorado law governs.

£

3

[1-3] Although state law generally supplies the rules of decision in federal diversity cases, see 28 U.S.C. § 1652; Erie R. Co.
v, Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817,
822, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), it does not control the resolution of issues governed by
federal statute, see U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl.
2 (Supremacy Clause); 28 U.S.C. § 1652;
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404-405, 87 S.Ct.
1801, 1806, 18 L.Ed.2d 1270 (1967). Under
28 U.S.C. § 1291, "all fina^decisions of
the district courts" are appealable to the
courts of appeals. In using the phrase
"final decisions" Congress obviously did
not mean to borrow or incorporate state
law. "Final decisions" is not a term like
"property," which naturally suggests a reference to state-law concepts, cf. Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct.
2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); and the
context of its use in § 1291 makes such a
reference doubly implausible, since that
provision applies to all federal litigation
and not just diversity cases. Nor is it
possible to accept petitioner's contention
that § 1291 does not apply to diversity
cases because that would violate the Tenth
Amendment to the Constitution. We have
held that enactments "rationally capable of
classification" as procedural rules are necessary and proper for carrying into execution the power to establish federal courts
vested in Congress by Article III, § 1.
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472, 85
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S.Ct. 1136, 1144, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965); see
also Burlington Northern R. Co. v.
Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5, and n. 3, 107 S.Ct
967, 969, and n. 3, 94 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987). A
statute mandating when an appeal may be
taken from one federal court to another
certainly meets this test. Cf. Cohen v.
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337
U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528
(1949) (treating appealability as an issue of
federal law in a case brought under diversity jurisdiction).
[4, 5] The question before us, therefore,
is whether a decision on the merits is a
"final decision" as a matter of federal law
under § 1291 when the recoverability or
amount of attorney's fees for the litigation
remains to be determined. "A 'final decision' generally is one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for.
the court to do but execute the judgment"
Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233,
65 S.Ct 631, 633-634, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945).
A question remaining to be decided after
an order ending litigation on the merits
does not prevent finality if its resolution
will not alter the order or moot or revise
decisions embodied in the order. See, e.g.,
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294, 308-309, 82 S.Ct 1502, 1514-1515, 8
L.Ed.2d 510 (1962); Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 513516, 70 S.Ct. 322, 325-326, 94 L.Ed. 299
(1950). We have all but held that an attorney's fees determination 1 profits this description. In White v. New Hampshire
Dept of Employment Security, 455 U.S.
445, 102 S.Ct 1162, 71 L.Ed.2d 325 (1982),
we held that a request for attorney's fees
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is not a motion "to
alter or amend the judgment" within the
meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e) because it does not seek "reconsideration of matters properly encompassed in a
decision on the merits." 455 U.S., at 451,
102 S.Ct, at 1166. This holding was based
on our conclusion that "a request for attorney's fees under § 1988 raises legal issues
collateral to" and "separate from" the decision on the merits. Id., at 451^452, 102
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S.Ct, at 1166. We went so far as to observe in dicta that "[t]he collateral character of the fee issue establishes that an
outstanding fee question does not bar recognition of a merits judgment as 'final' and
'appealable.'" Id., at 452-453, n. 14, 102
S.Ct, at 1166-1167, n. 14. See also
Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307
U.S. 161, 170, 59 S.Ct. 777, 781-782, 83
L.Ed. 1184 (1939) (observing that a petition
for attorney's fees in equity is "an independent proceeding supplemental to the original proceeding and not a request for a
modification of the original decree").
The foregoing discussion is ultimately
question-begging, however, since it assumes that the order to which the fee issue
was collateral was an order ending litigation on the merits. If one were to regard
the demand for attorney's fees as itself
part of the merits, the analysis would not
apply. The merits would then not have
been concluded, and § 1291 finality would
not exist. See Liberty Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 740-742, 96
S.Ct. 1202, 1204-1205, 47 L.Ed.2d 435
(1976). As a general matter, at least, we
think it indisputable that a claim for attorney's fees is not part of the merits of the
action to which the fees pertain. Such an
award does not remedy the injury giving
rise to the action, and indeed is often available to the party defending against the
action. At common law, attorney's fees
were regarded as an element of "costs"
awarded to the prevailing party, see 10 C.
Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal
Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2665
(1983), which are not generally treated as
part of the merits judgment, cf. Fed.Rule
Civ.Proc. 58 ("Entry of the judgment
j^pishall not be delayed for the taxing of
costs"). Many federal statutes providing
for attorney's fees continue to specify that
they are to be taxed and collected as
"costs," see Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1,
43-48, 105 S.Ct 3012, 3035-3036, 87
L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting) (citing 63 such statutes)—as does, in
fact, the Colorado statute at issue here.
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Petitioner contends, however, that the
general status of attorney's fees for § 1291
purposes must be altered when the statutory or decisional law authorizing them
makes plain (as he asserts Colorado law
does) that they are to be part of the merits
judgment. This proposition is not without
some support. Some Courts of Appeals
have held that the statutes creating liability for attorney's fees can cause them to be
part of the merits relief for purposes of
§ 1291. See, e.g., Holmes v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 682 F.2d, at 1146; McQurter
v. Atlanta, 724 F.2d 881, 882 (CA11 1984)
(per curiam ). This Court itself implicitly
acknowledged the possibility of such an
approach in Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert,
444 U.S. 472, 100 S.Ct 745, 62 L.Ed.2d 676
(1980), where, in holding that a judgment
on the merits was final and immediately
appealable apart from the question of attorney's fees, we expressly distinguished
cases in which the plaintiff had specifically
requested attorney's fees as part of the
prayer in his complaint. Id., at 479-480,
100 S.Ct, at 749-750, n. 5. Now that we
are squarely confronted with the question,
however, we conclude that the § 1291 effect of an unresolved issue of attorney's
fees for the litigation at hand should not
turn upon the characterization of those
fees by the statute or decisional law that
authorizes them.
We have said elsewhere that "[t]he considerations that determine finality are not
abstractions but have reference to very
real interests—not merely those of the im
mediate parties, but, more particularly
those that pertain to the smooth function
ing of our judicial system." Republic Nat
ural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 69
68 S.Ct. 972, 977, 92 L.Ed. 1212 (1948)
Indeed, in the context of the finality provision governing appealability of matters
from state courts to this Court, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257,1202we have been willing in effect to
split the "merits," regarding a claim for an
accounting to be sufficiently "dissociated"
from a related claim for delivery of physical property that "[i]n effect, such a contro-
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versy is a multiple litigation allowing review of the adjudication which is concluded
because it is independent of, and unaffected by, another litigation with which it happens to be entangled." Radio Station
WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 126,
65 S.Ct. 1475, 1479, 89 L.Ed. 2092 (1945).
This practical approach to the matter suggests that what is of importance here is not
preservation of conceptual consistency in
the status of a particular fee authorization
as "merits" or "nonmerits," but rather
preservation of operational consistency and
predictability in the overall application of
§ 1291. This requires, we think, a uniform
rule that an unresolved issue of attorney's
fees for the litigation in question does not
prevent judgment on the merits from being
final.

I
!
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whether or not 1203there remains for adjudi*
cation a request for attorney's fees attributable to the case.
[6] Finally, petitioner argues that even
if the Court of Appeals properly decided
the question of appealability, the decision
constitutes a significant change in the law
and therefore should only be applied prospectively. Regardless of whether today's
decision works a change, our cases hold
that "[a] court lacks discretion to consider
the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction, and thus, by definition, a
jurisdictional ruling may never be made
prospective only." Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 379-380,
101 S.Ct 669, 676, 66 L.Ed.2d 571 (1981).
Since the Court of Appeals properly held
petitioner's notice of appeal from the decision on the merits to be untimely, and since
the taking of an appeal within the prescribed time is mandatory and jurisdictional, see Fed. Rules App.Proc. 2, 3(a), 4(aXl),
26(b); United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S.
220, 229, 80 S.Ct. 282, 288, 4 L.Ed.2d 259
(1960); Farley Transportation Co. v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 778 F.2d
1365, 1368-1370 (CA9 1985), the Court of
Appeals was without jurisdiction to review
the decision on the merits.
•
*
•

For all practical purposes an appeal of
merits-without-attorney's-fees when there
is a statute deeming the attorney's fees to
be part of the merits is no more harmful to
the trial process than an appeal of meritswithout-attorney's-fees when there is no
such statute. That "deeming"' does not
render the appeal more disruptive of ongoing proceedings, more likely to eliminate a
trial judge's opportunity for reconsideration, more susceptible to being mooted by
settlement, or in any way (except nominally) a more piecemeal enterprise. In short,
no interest pertinent to § 1291 is served by
The Tenth Circuit correctly concluded
according different treatment to attorney^,
fees deemed part of the merits recovery; that federal law governed the question of
and a significant interest is disserved. The appealability and that petitioner's judgment
time of appealability, having jurisdictional on the merits was final and appealable
consequences, should above all be clear. when entered. Accordingly, its judgment
We are not inclined to adopt a disposition is
that requires/the merits or nonmerits staAffirmed.
tus of each attorney's fee provision to be
clearly established before the time to ap|l£Y»UMIt»SYST£M>
peal can be clearly known. Courts and
litigants are best served by the bright-line
rule, which accords with traditional understanding, that a decision on the merits is a
"final decision" for purposes of § 1291
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sions it has rendered, and the other work performed by it,
(1) recommend policies to the governor, and
submit recommendation to employers, employment agencies and labor organizations to implement those policies,
(j) recommend any legislation concerning discrimination because of race sex, color, national
origin, religion, age, or handicap to the governor
that it considers necessary,
(k) within the limits of any appropriations
made for its operation, cooperate with other
agencies or organizations, both public and private, in the planning and conducting of educational programs designed to eliminate discriminatory practices prohibited under this chapter,
and
(1) adopt an official seal
(2) The division shall investigate alleged discriminatory practices involving officers or employees of
state government if requested to do so by the Career
Service Review Board
(3) (a) In any hearing held under the authority of
this chapter, the division may
(l) subpoena witnesses and compel their
attendance at the hearing,
(n) administer oaths and take the testimony of any person under oath, and
(m) compel any person to produce for examination any books, papers, or other information relating to the matters raised by the
complaint
(b) Any of the following may conduct hearings
d) the commission
(n) any commissioner,
(in) the coordinator, or
dv) a hearing examiner or agent appointed by the commission
(c) If a witness fails or refuses to obey a subpoena issued by the commission, the commission
may petition the district court to enforce the subpoena
(d) d) No person may be excused from attending or testifying or from producing records,
correspondence, documents, or other evidence in obedience to a subpoena issued by
the commission under the authority of this
section on the ground that the evidence or
the testimony required may tend to incriminate him or subject him to any penalty or
forfeiture
(n) No person may be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on
account of any transaction, matter, or thing
concerning which he shall be compelled to
testify or produce evidence after having
claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, except that a person testifying is not
exempt from prosecution and punishment for
perjury
i860
34-35-6. Discriminatory or unfair employment
practices — Permitted practices.
(1) It is a discriminatory or prohibited employment
practice
(a) d) for an employer to refuse to hire, or promote, or to discharge, demote, terminate any
person, or to retaliate against, harass, or discriminate in matters of compensation or in
terms, privileges, and conditions of employment against any person otherwise qualified,
because of race, color, sex, pregnancy, child-
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birth, or pregnancy-related conditions, age,
if the individual is 40 years of age or older,
religion, national origin, or handicap No applicant nor candidate for any job or position
may be considered "otherwise qualified," unless he possesses the education, training,
ability, moral character, integrity, disposition to work, adherence to reasonable rules
and regulations, and other job related qualifications required by an employer for any
particular job, job classification, or position
to be filled or created,
(n) as used in this chapter, 'to discriminate in matters of compensation" means the
payment of differing wages or salaries to employees having substantially equal experience, responsibilities, and skill for the particular job However, nothing in this chapter
prevents increases in pay as a result of longevity with the empiojfer, if the salary increases are uniformly applied and available
to all employees on a substantially proportional basis Nothing in this section prohibits an employer and employee from agreeing to a rate of pav or work schedule designed to protect the employee from loss of
Social Security payment or benefits if the
employee is eligible for those payments,
(b) for an employment agency
d) to refuse to list and properly classify for
employment, or to refuse to refer an individual for employment, in a known available job
for which the individual is otherwise qualified, because of race, color, sex, pregnancy,
childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions,
religion, national origin, age, if the individual is 40 years of age or older, or handicap,
(n) to comply with a request from an employer for referral of applicants for employment if the request indicates either directly
or indirectly that the employer discriminates
in employment on account of race, color, sex,
pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related
conditions, religion, national origin, age, if
the individual is 40 years of age or older, or
handicap,
(c) for a labor organization to exclude any individual otherwise qualified from full membership
rights in the labor organization, or to expel the
individual from membership in the labor organization, or to otherwise discriminate against or
harass any of its members in full employment of
work opportunity, or representation, because of
race, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, religion, national origin, age, if
the individual is 40 years of age or older, or
handicap,
(d) for any employer, employment agency, or
labor organization to print, or circulate, or cause
to be printed or circulated, any statement, advertisement, or publication, or to use any form of
application for employment or membership, or to
make any inquiry in connection with prospective
employment or membership, which expresses, either directly or indirectly, any limitation, specification, or discrimination as to race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, national origin, age, if the individual is 40 years of age or older, or handicap or
intent to make any such limitation, specification,
or discrimination, unless based upon a bona fide
occupational qualification, or required by, and
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given to, an agency of government for security
reasons;
(e) for any person, whether or not an employer,
an employment agency, a labor organization, or
the employees or members thereof, to aid, incite,
compel, or coerce the doing of an act defined in
tnis section to be a discriminatory or prohibited
employment practice, or to obstruct or prevent
any person from complying with this chapter, or
any order issued under it, or to attempt, either
directly or indirectly, to commit any act prohibited in this section,
(0 for any employer, labor organization, joint
apprenticeship committee, or vocational school,
providing, coordinating, or controlling apprenticeship programs, or providing, coordinating, or
controlling on-the-job-training programs, instruction, training, or retraining programs
(l) to deny to, or withhold from, any qualified person, because of race, color, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, religion, national origin, age, if the
individual is 40 years of age or older, or
handicap the right to be admitted to, or participate in any apprenticeship training program, on-the-job-training program, or other
occupational instruction, training or retraining program,
(n) to discriminate against or harass any
qualified person in that person's pursuit of
such programs, or to discriminate against
such a person in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of such programs, because of race,
color, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, religion, national
origin, age, if the individual is 40 years of
age or older, or handicap,
(in) to print, or publish, or cause to be
printed or published, any notice or advertisement relating to employment by the employer, or membership in or any classification or referral for employment bv a labor
organization, or relating to any classification
or referral for employment by an employment agency, indicating any preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination
based on race, color sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, religion, national origin, age, if the individual is
40 years of age or older, or handicap except
that a notice or advertisement may indicate
a preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination based on race, color, religion,
sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, age, national origin, or
handicap when religion, race, color, sex, age,
national origin, or handicap is a bona fide
occupational qualification for employment
Nothing contained in Subsections (l)(a) through
(l)(f) shall be construed to prevent the termination of
employment of an individual who is physically, mentally, or emotionally unable to perform the duties required by that individual's employment, or to preclude the variance of insurance premiums, of coverage on account of age, or affect any restriction upon
the activities of individuals licensed by the liquor authority with respect to persons under 21 years of age
(2) (a) It is not a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice
(0 for an employer to hire and employ employees, for an employment agency to classify or refer for employment any individual,
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for a labor organization to classify its membership or to classify or refer for employment
any individual or for an employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other
training or retraining programs to admit or
employ any individual in any such program,
on the basis of religion, sex, pregnancy,
childbirth or pregnancy-related conditions,
age, national origin, or handicap in those
certain instances where religion, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, age, if the individual is 40 years of
age or older, national origin, or handicap is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
that particular business or enterprise,
(n) for a school, college, university, or
other educational institution to hire and employ employees of a particular religion if the
school, college, university, or other educational institution is, in whole or in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or
managed by a particular religious corporation, association, or society, or if the curriculum of the school, college, university, or
other educational institution is directed toward the propagation of a particular religion,
(in) for an employer to give preference in
employment to his own spouse, son, son-inlaw, daughter, daughter-in-law, or to any
person for whom the employer is or would be
liable to furnish financial support if those
persons were unemployed, or for an employer to give preference in employment to
any person to whom the employer during the
preceding six months has furnished more
than one-half of total financial support regardless of whether or not the employer was
or is legally obligated to furnish support, or
for an employer to give preference in employment to any person whose education or training was substantially financed by the employer for a period of two years or more
(b) Nothing contained in this chapter applies
to any business or enterprise on or near an Indian reservation with respect to any publicly announced employment practice of the business or
enterprise under which preferential treatment is
given to any individual because he is a native
American-Indian living on or near an Indian reservation
(c) Nothing contained in this chapter shall be
interpreted to require any employer, employment
agency, labor organization, vocational school,
joint labor-management committee, or apprenticeship program subject to this chapter to grant
preferential treatment to any individual or to
any group because of the race, color, religion, sex,
age, national origin, or handicap of the individual or group 3n account of an imbalance which
may exist with respect to the total number or
percentage of persons of any race, color, religion,
sex, age, national origin, or handicap employed
by any employer, referred or classified for employment by an employment agency or labor organization, admitted to membership or classified
by any labor organization, or admitted to or employed in, any apprenticeship or other training
program, in comparison with the total number or
percentage of persons of that race, color, religion,
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sex, age, national origin, or handicap in any community or county or in the available work force
in any community or county.
(3) It is not a discriminatory or prohibited practice
with respect to age to observe the terms of a bona fide
seniority system or any bona fide employment benefit
plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan
which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of
this chapter except that no such employee benefit
plan shall excuse the failure to hire any individual.
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (3), or any other
statutory provision to the contrary, other than Subsection (5) and Section 67-5-8, and except where age
is a bona fide occupational qualification, no person
shall be subject to involuntary termination or retirement from employment on the basis of age alone, if
the individual is 40 years of age or older.
(5) Nothing in this section prohibits compulsory retirement of an employee who has attained at least 65
years of age, and who, for the two-year period immediately before retirement, is employed in a bona fide
executive or a high policymaking position, if that employee is entitled to an immediate nonforfeitable annual retirement benefit from his employer's pension,
profit-sharing, savings, or deferred compensation
plan, or any combination of those plans, which benefit equals, in the aggregate, at least $44,000.
1989
34-35-7.

Repealed.

1985

34-35-7.1.

P r o c e d u r e for aggrieved person to
file claim — Investigations — Adjudi-

cative proceedings — Settlement — Reconsideration — Determination.
(1) (a) Any person claiming to be aggrieved by a
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice may by himself, his attorney, or his agent,
make, sign, and file with the commission a request for agency action.
(b) Every request for agency action shall be
verified under oath or affirmation.
(c) A request for agency action made under
this section shall be filed within 180 days after
the alleged discriminatory or prohibited employment practice occurred.
(2) Any employer, labor organization, joint apprenticeship committee, or vocational school who has employees or members who refuse or threaten to refuse
to comply with the provisions of this chapter may file
with the commission a request for agency action asking the commission for assistance to obtain their compliance by conciliation or other remedial action.
(3) (a) Before a hearing is set or held as part of any
adjudicative proceeding, the commission shall
promptly assign an investigator to attempt a settlement between the parties by conference, conciliation, or persuasion.
(b) If no settlement is reached, the investigator shall make a prompt impartial investigation
of all allegations made in the request for agency
action.
(c) The commission and its staff, agents, and
employees shall conduct every investigation in
fairness to all parties and agencies involved, and
may not attempt a settlement between the parties if it is clear that no prohibited employment
practice has occurred.
(d) If the aggrieved party wishes to withdraw
the request for agency action, he must do so prior
to the issuance of a final order.
(4) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are unsuccessful, and the investigator uncovers insuffi-
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cient evidence during his investigation to support the allegations of discrimination or prohibited employment practice set out in the request
for agency action, the investigator shall formally
report these findings to the director.
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report,
the director may issue a determination and an
order for dismissal of the adjudicative proceeding.
(c) A party may make a written request to the
director for an evidentiary hearing to review de
novo the director's determination and orders
within 30 days of the date of the determination
and order for dismissal.
(5) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are unsuccessful, and the investigator uncovers sufficient evidence during his investigation to support the allegations of discrimination or prohibited employment practice set out in the request
for agency action, the investigator shall formally
report these findings to the director.
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report
the director may issue a determination and an
order based on the investigator's report.
(c) A party may file a written request to the
director for an evidentiary hearing to review de
novo the director's determination and order
within 30 days of the date of the determination
and order.
(d) If the director receives no timely request
for a hearing, the order requiring the respondent
to cease any discriminatory or prohibited employment practices and to provide relief to the
aggrieved party becomes the final order of the
commission.
(6) In any adjudicative proceeding, the investigator
who investigated the matter may not participate in a
hearing except as a witness, nor may he participate
in the deliberations of the presiding officer.
(7) Prior to commencement of an evidentiary hearing, the party filing the request for agency action
may reasonably and fairly amend any allegation, and
the respondent may amend its answer. Those amendments may be made during or after a hearing but
only with permission of the presiding officer.
(8) (a) If, upon all the evidence at a hearing, the
presiding officer finds that a respondent has not
engaged in a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice, the presiding officer shall issue an order dismissing the director's determination and ending the adjudicative proceeding.
(b) If a director's determination is dismissed,
the presiding officer may order that the respondent be reimbursed by the complaining party for
his attorneys' fees and costs.
(9) If upon all the evidence at the hearing, the presiding officer finds that a respondent has engaged in
a prohibited discriminatory practice, the presiding officer shall issue an order requiring the respondent to
cease any discrimination or prohibited employment
practice and to provide relief to the complaining
party, including reinstatement, back pay and benefits, and attorneys' fees.
(10) Conciliation between the parties is to be-urged
and facilitated at all stages of the adjudicative process.
(11) (a) Either party may file a written request for
review of the order by the commission in accordance with Section 63-46b-12.
(b) If there is no timely request for review by
the commission, the order issued by the presiding
officer becomes the final order of the commission.
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sex, age, national origin, or handicap in any community or county or in the available work force
in any community or county.
(3) It is not a discriminatory or prohibited practice
with respect to age to observe the terms of a bona fide
seniority system or any bona fide employment benefit
plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan
which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of
this chapter except that no such employee benefit
plan shall excuse the failure to hire any individual.
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (3), or any other
statutory provision to the contrary, other than Subsection (5) and Section 67-5-8, and except where age
is a bona fide occupational qualification, no person
shall be subject to involuntary termination or retirement from employment on the basis of age alone, if
the individual is 40 years of age or older.
(5) Nothing in this section prohibits compulsory retirement of an employee who has attained at least 65
years of age, and who, for the two-year period immediately before retirement, is employed in a bona fide
executive or a high policymaking position, if t h a t employee is entitled to an immediate nonforfeitable annual retirement benefit from his employer's pension,
profit-sharing, savings, or deferred compensation
plan, or any combination of those plans, which benefit equals, in the aggregate, at least $44,000.
1989
34-35-7.

Repealed.

1985

34-35-7.1.

P r o c e d u r e for aggrieved person to
file claim — Investigations — Adjudi-

cative proceedings — Settlement — Reconsideration — Determination.
(1) (a) Any person claiming to be aggrieved by a
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice may by himself, his attorney, or his agent,
make, sign, and file with the commission a request for agency action.
(b) Every request for agency action shall be
verified under oath or affirmation.
(c) A request for agency action made under
this section shall be filed within 180 days after
the alleged discriminatory or prohibited employment practice occurred.
(2) Any employer, labor organization, joint apprenticeship committee, or vocational school who has employees or members who refuse or threaten to refuse
to comply with the provisions of this chapter may file
with the commission a request for agency action asking the commission for assistance to obtain their compliance by conciliation or other remedial action.
(3) (a) Before a hearing is set or held as part of any
adjudicative proceeding, the commission shall
promptly assign an investigator to attempt a settlement between the parties by conference, conciliation, or persuasion.
(b) If no settlement is reached, the investigator shall make a prompt impartial investigation
of all allegations made in the request for agency
action.
(c) The commission and its staff, agents, and
employees shall conduct every investigation in
fairness to all parties and agencies involved, and
may not attempt a settlement between the parties if it is clear that no prohibited employment
practice has occurred
(d) If the aggrieved party wishes to withdraw
the request for agency action, he must do so prior
to the issuance of a final order.
(4) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are unsuccessful, and the investigator uncovers insuffi-
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cient evidence during his investigation to support the allegations of discrimination or prohibited employment practice set out in the request
for agency action, the investigator shall formally
report these findings to the director.
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report,
the director may issue a determination and an
order for dismissal of the adjudicative proceeding.
ic) A party may make a written request to the
director for an evidentiary hearing to review de
novo the directors determination and orders
within 30 days of the date of the determination
and order for dismissal.
(5) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are unsuccessful, and the investigator uncovers sufficient evidence during his investigation to support the allegations of discrimination or prohibited employment practice set out in the request
for agency action, the investigator shall formally
report these findings to the director.
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report
the director may issue a determination and an
order based on the investigator's report.
(c) A party may file a written request to the
director for an evidentiary hearing to review de
novo the director's determination and order
within 30 days of the date of the determination
and order.
(d) If the director receives no timely request
for a hearing, the order requiring the respondent
to cease any discriminatory or prohibited employment practices and to provide relief to the
aggrieved party becomes the final order of the
commission.
(6) In any adjudicative proceeding, the investigator
who investigated the matter may not participate in a
hearing except as a witness, nor may he participate
in the deliberations of the presiding officer.
(7) Prior to commencement of an evidentiary hearing, the party filing the request for agency action
may reasonably and fairly amend any allegation, and
the respondent may amend its answer. Those amendments may be made during or after a hearing but
only with permission of the presiding officer.
(8) (a) If, upon all the evidence at a hearing, the
presiding officer finds that a respondent has not
engaged in a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice, the presiding officer shall issue an order dismissing the director's determination and ending the adjudicative proceeding.
(b) If a director's determination is dismissed,
the presiding officer may order that the respondent be reimbursed by the complaining party for
his attorneys' fees and costs.
(9) If upon all the evidence at the hearing, the presiding officer finds that a respondent has engaged in
a prohibited discriminatory practice, the presiding officer shall issue an order requiring the respondent to
cease any discrimination or prohibited employment
practice and to provide relief to the complaining
party, including reinstatement, back pay and benefits, and attorneys' fees.
(10) Conciliation between the parties is to be u»ged
and facilitated at all stages of the adjudicative process.
(11) (a) Either party may file a written request for
review of the order by the commission in accordance with Section 63-46b-12.
(b) If there is no timely request for review by
the commission, the order issued by the presiding
officer becomes the final order of the commission.
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(c) The presiding officer may impose the conditions at any time after the intervention.
1967
63-46b-10.

P r o c e d u r e s for formal adjudicative
proceedings — Orders.
In formal adjudicative proceedings:

(1) Within a reasonable time after the hearing, or after the filing of any post-hearing papers
permitted by the presiding officer, or within the
time required by any applicable statute or rule of
the agency, the presiding officer shall sign and
issue an order that includes:
(a) a statement of the presiding officer's
findings of fact based exclusively on the evidence of record in the adjudicative proceedings or on facts officially noted;
(b) a statement of the presiding officer's
conclusions of law;
(c) a statement of the reasons for the presiding officer's decision;
(d) a statement of any relief ordered by
the agency;
(e) a notice of the right to apply for reconsideration;
(f) a notice of any right to administrative
or judicial review of the order available to
aggrieved parties; and
(g) the time limits applicable to any reconsideration or review.
(2) The presiding officer may use his experience, technical competence, and specialized
knowledge to evaluate the evidence.
(3) No finding of fact that was contested may
be based solely on hearsay evidence unless that
evidence is admissible under the Utah Rules of
Evidence.
(4) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from issuing interim orders to:
(a) notify the parties of further hearings;
(b) notify the parties of provisional rulings
on a portion of the issues presented; or
(c) otherwise provide for the fair and efficient conduct of the adjudicative proceeding.
1988

63-46b-ll. Default.
(1) The presiding officer may enter an order of default against a party if:
(a) a party in an informal adjudicative proceeding fails to participate in the adjudicative
proceeding;
(b) a party to a formal adjudicative proceeding
fails to attend or participate in a properly scheduled hearing after receiving proper notice; or
(c) a respondent in a formal adjudicative proceeding fails to file a response under Section
63-46b-6.
(2) An order of default shall include a statement of
the grounds for default and shall be mailed to all
parties.
(3) (a) A defaulted party may seek to have the
agency set aside the default order, and any order
in the adjudicative proceeding issued subsequent
to the default order, by following the procedures
outlined in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(b) A motion to set aside a default and any
subsequent order shall be made to the presiding
officer.
(c) A defaulted party may seek agency review
under Section 63-46b-12, or reconsideration under Section 63-46b-13, only on the decision of the
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presiding officer on the motion to set aside the
default.
(4) (a) In an adjudicative proceeding begun by the
agency, or in an adjudicative proceeding begun
by a party that has other parties besides the
party in default, the presiding officer shall, after
issuing the order of default, conduct any further
proceedings necessary to complete the adjudicative proceeding without the participation of the
party in default and shall determine all issues in
the adjudicative proceeding, including those affecting the defaulting party.
(b) In an adjudicative proceeding that has no
parties other than the agency and the party in
default, the presiding officer shall, after issuing
the order of default, dismiss the proceeding. 1988
63-46b-12. Agency review — Procedure.
(1) (a) If a statute or the agency's rules permit parties to any adjudicative proceeding to seek review
of an order by the agency or by a superior agency,
the aggrieved party may file a written request
for review within 30 days after the issuance of
the order with the person or entity designated for
that purpose by the statute or rule.
(b) The request shall:
(i) be signed by the party seeking review;
(ii) state the grounds for review and the
relief requested;
(iii) state the date upon which it was
mailed; and
(iv) be sent by mail to the presiding officer
and to each party.
(2) Within 15 days of the mailing date of the request for review, or within the time period provided
by agency rule, whichever is longer, any party may
file a response with the person designated by statute
or rule to receive the response. One copy of the response shall be sent by mail to each of the parties and
to the presiding officer.
(3) If a statute or the agency's rules require review
of an order by the agency or a superior agency, the
agency or superior agency shall review the order
within a reasonable time or within the time required
by statute or the agency's rules.
(4) To assist in review, the agency or superior
agency may by order or rule permit the parties to file
briefs or other papers, or to conduct oral argument.
(5) Notice of hearings on review shall be mailed to
all parties.
(6) (a) Within a reasonable time after the filing of
any response, other filings, or oral argument, or
within the time required by statute or applicable
rules, the agency or superior agency shall issue a
written order on review.
(b) The order on review shall be signed by the
agency head or by a person designated by the
agency for that purpose and shall be mailed to
each party.
(c) The order on review shall contain:
(i) a designation of the statute or rule permitting or requiring review;
(ii) a statement of the issues reviewed;
(iii) findings of fact as to each of the issues
reviewed;
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the
issues reviewed;
(v) the reasons for the disposition;
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding
officer or agency is to be affirmed, reversed,
or modified, and whether all or any portion
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of the adjudicative proceeding is to be remanded,
(vn) a notice of any right of further administrative reconsideration or judicial review available to aggrieved parties, and
mil) the time limits applicable to any appeal or review
1968
63-46b-13. A g e n c y r e v i e w — Reconsideration.
(1) (a) Within 20 days after the date that an order
is issued for which review by the agency or by a
superior agency under Section 63-46b-12 is unavailable, and if the order would otherwise constitute final agency action, any party may file a
written request for reconsideration with the
agency, stating the specific grounds upon which
relief is requested
(b) Unless otherwise provided by statute, the
filing of the request is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial review of the order
(2) The request for reconsideration shall be filed
with the agency and one copy shall be sent by mail to
each party by the person making the request
(3) (a) The agency head, or a person designated for
that purpose, shall issue a written order granting
the request or denying the request
(b) If the agency head or the person designated
for t h a t purpose does not issue an order within 20
days after the filing of the request, the request
for reconsideration shall be considered to be denied
1968
63~46b-14.

J u d i c i a l r e v i e w — Exhaustion of administrative remedies.

(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of
final agency action, except in actions where judicial
review is expressly prohibited by statute
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative remedies available, except that
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not
exhaust administrative remedies if this chapter
or any other statute states that exhaustion is not
required,
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the requirement to exhaust any or
all administrative remedies if
U) the administrative remedies are inadequate, or
(n) exhaustion of remedies would result in
irreparable harm disproportionate to the
public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action within 30 days after
the date that the order constituting the final
agency action is issued or is considered to have
been issued under Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b)
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all
other appropriate parties as respondents and
shall meet the form requirements specified in
this chapter
1968
63-46b-15.

J u d i c i a l r e v i e w — Informal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) (a) The district courts shall have jurisdiction to
review by trial de novo all final agency actions
resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings, except that the juvenile court shall have
jurisdiction over all state agency actions relating
to removal or placement decisions regarding children in state custody

63-46 b-16

(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall be as provided in the
statute governing the agency or, in the absence
of such a venue provision, in the county where
the petitioner resides or maintains his principal
place of business
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal
adjudicative proceedings shall be a complaint
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
and shall include
(D the name and mailing address of the
party seeking judicial review,
(n) the name and mailing address of the
respondent agency,
(m) the title and date of the final agency
action to be reviewed, together with a duplicate copy, summary, or brief description of
the agency action,
dv) identification of the persons who were
parties in the informal adjudicative proceedings that led to the agency action,
(v) a copy of the written agency order from
the informal proceeding,
(vi) facta demonstrating that the party
seeking judicial review is entitled to obtain
judicial review,
(vn) a request for relief, specifying the
type and extent of relief requested,
(vm) a statement of the reasons why the
petitioner is entitled to relief
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in
the district court are governed by the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure
(3) (a) T h e district court, without a jury, shall determine all questions of fact and law and a n y
constitutional issue presented in t h e pleadings
(b) T h e Utah Rules of Evidence apply in judicial proceedings under this section
1990
63-46b-16.

J u d i c i a l r e v i e w — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all
final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings
i2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review
of agency action with the appropriate appellate
court in the fonm required by the appellate rules
of the appropriate appellate court
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional filings
and proceedings in the appellate court
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the
agency's record for judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, except that
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the
record,
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for the record
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or
organize the record, or
(n) according to any other provision of
law
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a
person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any ot the following
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(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on
which the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues
requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or
applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed
to follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were
illegally constituted as a decision-making body
or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency,
that is not supported by substantial evidence
when viewed in light of the whole record before
the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to
the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
1988

63-46b-17. Judicial review — Type of relief.
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudicative proceedings by the district court or the review of formal adjudicative proceedings by an appellate court, the court may award damages or
compensation only to the extent expressly authorized by statute.
(b) In granting relief, the court may:
(i) order agency action required by law;
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as required by law;
(iii) set aside or modify agency action;
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of
agency action; or
(v) remand the matter to the agency for
further proceedings.
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of
final agency action are reviewable by a higher court,
if authorized by statute.
1087

63-46b-18. Judicial review — Stay and other
temporary remedies pending final disposition.
(1) Unless precluded by another statute, the
agency may grant a stay of its order or other temporary remedy during the pendency of judicial review,
according to the agency's rules.
(2) Parties shall petition the agency for a stay or
other temporary remedies unless extraordinary circumstances require immediate judicial intervention.
(3) If the agency denies a stay or denies other temporary remedies requested by a party, the agency's
order of denial shall be mailed to all parties and shall
specify the reasons why the stay or other temporary
remedy was not granted.
(4) If the agency has denied a stay or other temporary remedy to protect the public health, safety, or
welfare against a substantial threat, the court may
not grant a stay or other temporary remedy unless it
finds that:
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(a) the agency violated its own rules in denying the stay; or
(b) (i) the party seeking judicial review is
likely to prevail on the merits when the
court finally disposes of the matter;
(ii) the party seeking judicial review will
suffer irreparable injury without immediate
relief;
(iii) granting relief to the party seeking
review will not substantially harm other
parties to the proceedings; and
(iv) the threat to the public health, safety,
or welfare relied upon by the agency is not
sufficiently serious to justify the agency's action under the circumstances.
1967

63-46b-19. Civil enforcement
(1) (a) In addition to other remedies provided by
law, an agency may seek enforcement of an order
by seeking civil enforcement in the district
courts.
(b) The action seeking civil enforcement of an
agency's order must name, as defendants, each
alleged violator against whom the agency seeks
to obtain civil enforcement.
(c) Venue for an action seeking civil enforcement of an agency's order shall be determined by
the requirements of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(d) The action may request, and the court may
grant, any of the following:
(i) declaratory relief;
(ii) temporary or permanent injunctive relief;
(iii) any other civil remedy provided by
law; or
(iv) any combination of the foregoing.
(2) (a) Any person whose interests are directly impaired or threatened by the failure of an agency
to enforce an agency's order may timely file a
complaint seeking civil enforcement of that order, but the action may not be commenced:
(i) until at least 30 days after the plaintiff
has given notice of his intent to seek civil
enforcement of the alleged violation to the
agency head, the attorney general, and to
each alleged violator against whom the petitioner seeks civil enforcement;
(ii) if the agency has filed and is diligently
prosecuting a complaint seeking civil enforcement of the same order against the
same or a similarly situated defendant; or
(iii) if a petition for judicial review of the
same order has been filed and is pending in
court.
(b) The complaint seeking civil enforcement of
an agency's order must name, as defendants, the
agency whose order is sought to be enforced, the
agency that is vested with the power to enforce
the order, and each alleged violator against
whom the plaintiff seeks civil enforcement.
(c) Except to the extent expressly authorized
by statute, a complaint seeking civil enforcement
of an agency's order may not request, and the
court may not grant, any monetary payment
apart from taxable costs.
(3) In a proceeding for civil enforcement of an
agency's order, in addition to any other defenses allowed by law, a defendant may defend on the ground
that:
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Rule 54

PART VII.
JUDGMENT.
Rule 54. Judgments; costs.
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree
and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a
recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings.
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties.
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated,
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the
rights and liabilities of all the parties.
(c) Demand for judgment.
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not
demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one
or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as
between or among themselves.
(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different
in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the
demand for judgment.
(d) Costs.
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is
made either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise
directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination
of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law.
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five
days after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against
whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs
and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like
memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the
items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs
claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs,
file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court in which the
judgment was rendered.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the
time of or subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and
conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be
considered as served and filed on the date judgment is entered.
(3), (4) [Deleted.]
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment The clerk must
include in any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision
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from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or
ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed
or ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment, insert the
amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a
similar notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment docket.
(Amended effective January 1, 1985.)
Amendment Notes. — Subdivisions (d)(3)
and (d)(4), relating to the award of costs by the
appellate court and costs in original proceedings before the Supreme Court, were repealed
with the adoption of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, effective January 1, 1985. See,
now, Rule 34(d), Utah R.App.P.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 54, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Continuances, discre-

tion to require payment of costs, U.R.C.P.
40(b).
Judges' retirement fee, taxing as costs,
§ 49-6-301.
State, payment of costs awarded against,
§ 78-27-13.
Stay of judgment up>on multiple claims,
U.R.C.P. 62(h).
Witness fees, taxing as costs, § 21-5-8.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Absence of express determination.
Amendment of pleadings.
Appeal as of right.
Certification not determinative.
Costs.
—In general.
—Challenge of award.
—Depositions.
—Discretionary.
—Expenses of preparation for action.
—Failure to object.
—Liability of state.
—Service on adverse party.
—Statutory limits.
—Untimely filing of memorandum.
—When not demanded.
Default judgments.
Effect of partial final judgment.
Final order.
—Appealability.
—Attorney's fee award.
—Claims for relief.
—Complete disposal of claim or party.
—Multiple parties.
—No just reason for delay.
—Review of finality.
—Separate claims.
Inconsistent oral statements.
Interest on judgment.
Judgment based on unpleaded theory.
Judgment in favor of nonparty.
Motion to reconsider.
Pleading in the alternative.
Presumption of finality.
Real party in interest.
Relief not demanded in pleadings.
Specific performance request.
Unpleaded issue tried by consent.
Cited.
Absence of express determination.
In action based on alleged breach of loan
agreement, where trial court improperly dismissed plaintiff-corporation's complaint with
prejudice and granted defendant-bank judgment on its counterclaim and cross-claim, judgment on cross-claim and counterclaim would
be subject, on remand, to revision since all
claims presented had not been adjudicated and
since trial court made no express determina-

tion as required by this section. M. & S. Constr.
& Eng'g Co. v. Clearfield State Bank, 24 Utah
2d 139, 467 P.2d 410 (1970).
Amendment of pleadings.
The proper application of Rule 15(b) and
Subdivision (c)(1) of this rule, is that amendments should be allowed where a case has actually been tried on a different issue or a different theory than had been pleaded. First Sec.
Bank v. Colonial Ford, Inc., 597 P.2d 859
(Utah 1979).
Appeal as of right.
Wliere the requirements of this rule concerning appeal of orders in multi-party or multiclaim actions are satisfied, the parties are entitled to appeal such orders as a matter of right,
and the Supreme Court does not have discretion to refuse to review the orders. Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765 (Utah 1984).
After a party or parties have availed themselves of the provisions of Subdivision (b), allowing an entry of judgment on "fewer than all
of the claims or parties," an appeal may be had
on the adjudicated claims or by those parties.
All Weather Insulation, Inc., v. Amiron Dev.
Corp., 702 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1985).
Certification not determinative.
This rule does not necessarily mean there is
a final judgment merely because the court's order so recites; there was in fact no final judgment where the trial court denied defendant's
motion to dismiss, thus leaving the parties in
court, then entered an order that the denial
was a final judgment. Little v. Mitchell, 604
P.2d 918 (Utah 1979).
Costs.
—In general.
Costs were not recoverable at common law
and are therefore generally allowable only in
the amounts and in the manner provided by
statute. Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771
(Utah 1980).
"Costs," as used in Subdivision (d)(1), means
those fees which are required to be paid to the
court and to witnesses, and which the statutes
authorize to be included in the judgment.
Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980).
Subdivision (d)(2) provides a process of review by a trial court of the amount claimed to
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an entry of judgment, nor was it a final judgment for purposes of appeal. Wilson v. Manning, 645 P.2d 655 (Utah 1982): Utah State
Tax ComnVn v. Erekson, 714 P.2d 1151 (Utah
1986); Sather v. Gross, 727 P.2d 212 (Utah
1986); Ahistrom v. Anderson, 728 P.2d 979
(Utah 1986).

Rule 4

An unsigned minute entry does not constitute a final order for purposes of appeal. State
v. Crowley, 737 P 2d 198 (Utah 1987).
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Appealability of order suspending
imposition or execution of sentence, 51
A.L.R.4th 939.

Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken.
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal
is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial
court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed
from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible
entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of
entry of the judgment or order appealed from.
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional
findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting
or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1)
under Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal for
all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the
disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of
the order of the trial court disposing of the motion as provided above.
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in
paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of
the trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof.
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date
on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires.
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal
upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the
prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires.
Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given
to the other parties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court.
No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the
date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later.
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(e) Costs in other proceedings and agency appeals. In all other matters
before the court, including appeals from an agency, costs may be allowed as in
cases on appeal from a trial court. Within 15 days after the expiration of the
time in which a petition for rehearing may be filed or within 15 days after an
order denying such a petition, the party to whom costs have been awarded
may file with the clerk of the appellate court and serve upon the adverse party
an itemized and verified bill of costs. The adverse party may, within 5 days
after the service of the bill of costs file a notice of objection and a motion to
have the costs taxed by the clerk. If no objection to the cost bill is filed within
the allotted time, the clerk shall thereupon tax the costs and enter judgment
against the adverse party. If the adverse party timely objects to the cost bill,
the clerk, upon reasonable notice and hearing, shall determine and settle the
costs, tax the same, and a judgment shall be entered thereon against the
adverse party. The determination by the clerk shall be reviewable by the
court upon the request of either party made within 5 days of the entry of
judgment; unless otherwise ordered, oral argument shall not be permitted. A
judgment under this section may be filed with the clerk of any district court in
the state, who shall docket a certified copy of the same in the manner and
with the same force and effect as judgments of the district court.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Barber v. Barber, 792 P.2d 134
(Utah Ct. App. 1990).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and
Error $§ 1009 to 1024.

C.J.S. — 5 C J.S. Appeal and Error § 1979.
Key Numbers. — Costs «=» 221 et seq.

Rule 35. Petition for rehearing.
(a) Time for filing; contents; answer; oral argument not permitted. A
rehearing will not be granted in the absence of a petition for rehearing. A
petition for rehearing may be filed with the clerk within 14 days after the
entry of the decision of the court, unless the time is shortened or enlarged by
order. The petition shall state with particularity the points of law or fact
which the petitioner claims the court has overlooked or misapprehended and
shall contain such argument in support of the petition as the petitioner desires. Counsel for petitioner must certify that the petition is presented in good
faith and not for delay. Oral argument in support of the petition will not be
permitted. No answer to a petition for rehearing will be received unless requested by the court. The answer to the petition for rehearing shall be filed
within 14 days after the entry of the order requesting the answer, unless
otherwise ordered by the court. A petition for rehearing will not be granted in
the absence of a request for an answer.
(b) Form of petition; length. The petition shall be in a form prescribed by
Rule 27. An original and six copies shall be filed with the court. Two copies
shall be served on counsel for each party separately represented. Except by
order of the court, a petition for rehearing and any response requested by the
court shall not exceed 15 pages.
(c) Action by court if granted. If a petition for rehearing is granted, the
court may make a final disposition of the cause without reargument, or may
restore it to the calendar for reargument or resubmission, or may make such
other orders as are deemed appropriate under the circumstances of the particular case.
(d) Untimely or consecutive petitions. Petitions for rehearing that are
not timely presented under this rule and consecutive petitions for rehearing
will not be received by the clerk.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)

